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
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
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# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



## THESIS

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THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES:  
CASE STUDY IN JAPANESE-SOVIET RELATIONS

by

Michael A. Thompson

June 1982

Thesis Advisor:

E. A. Olsen


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The Northern Territories:  
Case Study in Japanese-Soviet Relations

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

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## ABSTRACT

Japanese-Soviet relations have historically been, as they are today, characterized by distrust and dislike for each other. One of the manifestations of this antagonistic relationship is the Northern Territories problem - the conflicting claims of Japan and the Soviet Union to a group of four islands in the southern Kuriles.

By presenting a case study of the Northern Territories dispute, this thesis will attempt to illuminate some of the salient differences in the national patterns of Japan and the Soviet Union. It is the hypothesis of this thesis that the Northern Territories problem exists because Japan and the Soviet Union subsist and function in radically different paradigms - disparities in their historical, economic, political, geo-strategic, and philosophical existence.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Relations between Japan and the Soviet Union today, as in the past, are as cold as the waters that separate their lands. Their geographic proximity and the apparent complementary nature of their economic needs would seem to dictate relatively close relations; and yet, their dealings with each other historically have been antagonistic. What explains the enmity which these two great nations display toward each other? Neither side is comfortable with the present situation; so what prevents them from following a course that seems more in line with a rational pursuance of their national interests?

In an effort to shed some light on this enigmatic relationship, this thesis will attempt to define more clearly the elements of Japanese-Soviet intercourse by examining the problem that is today the greatest obstacle to dispelling the animosity that exists - the Northern Territories problem. The Northern Territories issue centers around the rival claims of the Soviet Union and Japan to a group of four islands in the southern Kuriles that were occupied by the Russians after 1945. Japan's refusal to sign a peace treaty officially concluding World War II with the USSR is based on Japanese demands for the return of the islands and the Soviet position that the issue is settled. Three and a half decades after the cessation of war, the territorial dispute is widely acknowledged

to be the greatest single obstacle to closer Japanese-Soviet relations.

The aim of this thesis, a case study of the Northern Territories problem, will be to discover some of the principal components and catalysts that shape the dealings between Japan and the Soviet Union. It is the hypothesis of this thesis that the Northern Territories problem exists because the Soviet Union and Japan subsist and function in radically different paradigms - disparities in their historical, economic, political, geo-strategic, and philosophical existence. Both Japan and the Soviet Union have territorial problems with other nations, but none have been as intractable and emotional as the Northern Territories. A solution to the problem may prove to be possible only with a revision of one of the nations' paradigms, a sweepingly significant event.

The procedure to be used in this thesis will be to present the historical development of the Kurile Islands (Chapter II), their strategic importance (Chapter III), and the Soviet and Japanese claims to the disputed territory (Chapter IV). After presenting this background material, the Soviet perspective of the problem (Chapter V) will be analyzed by examining the Russian concept of territory, its interests in the Northern Territories, and its military activities in the area. Chapter VI will present Japan's perspective by examining the Japanese concept of territory, their diplomatic efforts and motivations,

their distrust of Russian intentions, the role of Japanese politics in the issue, and the involvement of the Japanese people. Because bilateral relations never exist in a vacuum, Chapter VII will discuss the perspectives and positions of other regional powers. Chapter VIII will present a prognosis for a resolution to the dispute, and Chapter IX will elucidate the hypothesis in light of the presented material. A chronology of events and appropriate maps are provided in order to aid the reader in digesting the activities and settings of the Northern Territories problem.

## II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE KURILE ISLANDS

### A. THE SETTING

The Kurile Islands consist of some thirty-six islands and thousands of tiny islets stretching from Soviet Kamchatka in the north to the Japanese islands of Hokkaido in the south. The archipelago is bounded on the east by the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Okhotsk on the west. Their location dictate that the Kuriles be a logical place for the meeting of the Russians and the Japanese. Inaccessibility, oceanography, and climatic conditions, as well as a general lack of interest, have been determinants in likening the Kuriles to the end of the world. The islands total some 10,000 square kilometers with half of that total represented by the two largest islands of Kunashir and Iturup.<sup>1</sup> This makes the Kuriles comparable in size to the Hawaiian Islands and about seven times larger than the Ryukyu Islands.

Winter in the islands is characterized by cold arctic air blowing from the continent from November to March. The Okhotsk side of the islands receives the brunt of these blasts from Siberia, whereas the Pacific side, protected by the mountainous terrain on each island, is relatively warmer. Ice during the winter months makes maritime use of the straits between the islands a hazardous adventure.<sup>2</sup> Summer brings fog, rain, and widely varying temperatures. In the northern part of the island chain temperatures reaching the 50's are rare, whereas

the southern side can experience 80-degree weather. Winds frequently reach hurricane proportions, and storms of extremely destructive force periodically batter the islands.

Geologically, the Kuriles are volcanic protrusions with over 100 volcanoes on the islands, 39 of which are active.<sup>3</sup> Lava flows, "heated beaches", hot springs, and gaseous emissions are found throughout the chain. Additionally, tidal waves, strong ocean currents, and seaquakes make ocean travel around the islands a cause for concern.

The islands possess many of the forms of plant life present on the Asian continent. All types of deciduous and coniferous trees populate the archipelago, with wild grasses and bamboo in abundance. Fruits and vegetables thrive especially well in the southern islands, and Soviet collective farms have been established there.<sup>4</sup> Animal life includes bears, foxes, rabbits, and many other common species. Particularly important in the early development of the islands were the presence of seals and sea otters. They were vigorously hunted for their valuable pelts and at one time were almost totally extinct. Today, as a result of Soviet protective law, they are populating the archipelago in ever increasing numbers.

Perhaps the greatest wealth of the Kuriles lies in its abundant marine life. Sea vegetation, in the form of kelp, seaweed, and algae, have historically been harvested in large quantities for a variety of uses. Salmon, mackerel, cod, king crab, and whales habitate the waters near the islands

and have provided fishermen from various lands with bountiful catches.

#### B. PREHISTORY TO 1855

The prehistory of the Kuriles is a mystery. Neither Japan, Russia, or any other country has been able to adequately describe its human genesis and early development. It has generally been accepted that the Ainu people were the first inhabitants along with small groups of natives from the Kamchatka Peninsula.<sup>5</sup> Traces of Aleutian Eskimos have also been uncovered in archaeological excavations. The Ainu inhabitants have gradually been reduced throughout the years and only pockets remain today.

Earliest exploration of the archipelago from outside forces is believed to have first occurred around the middle of the seventeenth century when Dutch, Japanese, and Russians all converged on the islands at about the same time. The Dutch were looking for a mythical string of islands full of gold and precious gems; the Japanese interests were in trading with the Ainu; and the Russians, as an extension of their fur-trapping efforts in Kamchatka and Sakhalin Island, were searching for more sources of pelts and markets to sell them. Portuguese, Spanish, and English explorers and traders also set foot in the Kurile Islands, but, like the Dutch, soon abandoned their dreams of material gain and deemed the islands worthless.

Russian interests, as stated, were primarily centered on the fur resources represented by the wealth of seal and sea otter pelts. Later, tsarist explorers and traders began to view the islands as stepping-stones to Japan and the enticing trade that that mysterious land represented. The Russian government commissioned explorations and mapping expeditions to detail the area and determine the feasibility of establishing productive contacts with the Japanese.<sup>6</sup> For their part, the Japanese, under the isolation of the Tokugawa shogunate, had promoted trade with the Ainu, fished in the northern waters, and generally viewed the Kuriles as a maritime buffer with the outside world, of which there was little official concern.

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the Russians continued to explore and trade in the islands, providing interesting accounts of the harsh early life in the Kurile chain.<sup>7</sup> The Japanese repelled all attempts by the persistent Russians to establish trade relations and even attacked Russian ships in the northern waters. Shipwrecked or lost Russian sailors, like most foreigners apprehended by the Japanese, were frequently disposed of with the swift stroke of a samurai sword. As English and American whalers and foreign traders bound for the Orient began to penetrate the Kuriles in search of whales or necessary provisions, the Japanese realized that foreign intervention and exploration of the archipelago must be controlled if Western contacts were to be contained.



Although Commodore Perry's "black ships" signalled the formal opening of Japan to the West, Russia had always been a more constant force in pressing the Japanese for trade concessions. As a check on the spreading influence of the British in the Far East, and especially in China, the Russian empire had continued to push hard to the east; Japan was a natural conclusion to that effort. Tsar Nicholas I, after having heard of the departure of the Perry expedition from the United States, dispatched Admiral Putiatin, in charge of a four-vessel force, to Japan in hopes of either beating the Americans to the punch or, if too late, protecting Russian interests in the region.<sup>8</sup> Putiatin landed in Nagasaki on 21 August 1853; his instructions were threefold: (1) open diplomatic relations with the Japanese, (2) open the way for trade relations between the two countries, and (3) settle the boundaries and territorial ambiguities of Sakhalin Island and the Kuriles. After presenting his demands to the Japanese officials, Putiatin (like Perry) departed with a promise to return.

Meanwhile, Turkey declared war on Russia in October, 1853, and the French and British joined the Turks in what was known as the Crimean War. Now English and French war vessels in the Far East patrolled the waters of the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea, and the Sea of Okhotsk in search of Russian ships; Russian ground troops also were committed to the Crimean area. So when Admiral Putiatin sailed into Shimoda on 4 December

1854, the situation was entirely changed. Russia was anxious to conclude a treaty, as its interests lay in the west.<sup>9</sup> On the other side of the bargaining table Japanese thought had turned to using the Chinese tactic of combating foreigners with other foreigners, and thus they too had decided that a treaty was in their best interests. The Treaty of Shimoda between Russia and Japan was signed on 7 February 1855, providing generally the same concessions as the Perry treaty. Territorially, it provided that the island of Sakhalin would remain in joint possession of both countries, and the Kurile Islands were divided between Iturup and Urup Islands, with the southern part going to Japan, the remainder to Russia.<sup>10</sup> So now the legal status of the Kurile Islands had been firmly established, not to the total satisfaction of both parties, but to the temporary appeasement of each.

#### C. 1855-1875

During the next twenty years, 1855-1875, each section of the Kuriles was absorbed into its respective sphere of control. The southern Kuriles were integrated into the Japanese empire but were only loosely administered. The shogun and subsequent officials of the Meiji period made no effort to militarily or commercially develop the islands. The Russians did little more with their section, although the government dispatched cartographers and surveyors to fully ascertain the extent of its possessions. The new

area of contention between Japan and Russia was Sakhalin. The Treaty of Shimoda (1855) had provided for joint possession, but soon both parties concluded that this was an unsatisfactory arrangement and should be changed. Both pushed their arguments for sovereignty over Sakhalin, and the need for compromise was soon apparent. So on 7 May 1875, Japan and Russia signed the Treaty of St. Petersburg giving exclusive possession of Sakhalin to Russia and sole ownership of the Kuriles to Japan.<sup>11</sup> Many Japanese denounced the treaty as an unnecessary renunciation of the long-standing Sakhalin claims for islands already considered the "natural" fiefdom of Japan. But in light of the fact that Japan was certainly in no position to challenge the power of tsarist Russia, the exchange was probably a pragmatic exercise in Japanese diplomacy.

#### D. JAPANESE DOMINATION

With the entire archipelago reverting to Japanese ownership, the Kuriles were administratively incorporated into the Hokkaido district. The islands quickly seemed to present more problems than their apparent value; a meaningful census of the inhabitants was difficult enough, much less their total co-optation into the rapidly changing world of Meiji Japan. But the greatest problem came from the poachers and pirates roaming the northern Pacific waters. Gradually, more and more Japanese came to the islands, and the native Ainu gave way to absorption, disease, and emigration.<sup>12</sup> There was no concerted

effort by the government to colonize the islands until the 1930's, but private institutions and land-hungry peasants combined their desires in chartered Japanese expeditions to establish settlements.

The Japanese began to realize the sizeable returns from the marine life that now lay in their hands. To a nation that depends to a significant degree on ocean production, this was a true blessing. Japanese businesses soon began to exploit the fishing grounds around the islands; not only were the Japanese consumers provided for, but also markets as far away as North and South America.<sup>13</sup> Elaborate canneries were built, and fishing fleets blanketed the waters off the islands. By 1939 the Kuriles' permanent inhabitants numbered some 19,000 Japanese.<sup>14</sup>

During the 1930's the Japanese government began, for security reasons, to close off the islands to visits by foreigners. The first airfield was established on Iturup in 1925, and harbors for military shipping were first constructed in the late 1920's. As the Japanese empire began to expand its political and military force, the Kuriles' strategic location soon became recognized as a way to cut Russian access to the Pacific Ocean from its eastern-most provinces, and as an area for naval maneuvers, hidden from the detection and observation of foreigners.

#### E. WAR IN THE KURILES

The years 1941 to 1945 saw the Kuriles involved in the Second World War; it was this conflict that would shape the destiny of the archipelago into the present loggerhead between Japan and the Soviet Union. During World War II the Kurile Islands were important military assets for the Japanese. As the Soviet Union had always been considered the greatest threat to Japan by the Japanese, the islands were strategic naval jewels. Japan could quite easily limit Soviet access to its eastern provinces to the single-line Trans-Siberian railroad. Japan felt as long as it held the Kuriles and controlled the three straits (Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima) in the region, the Soviet Union would never be a maritime power. But just as the Russian attention was being turned to Hitler's Germany, so was Japanese attention being diverted to increasing concerns with the United States. Iturup's Hitokoppa Bay was the marshalling area for Admiral Nagumo's carrier force that steamed southeast to attack Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.<sup>15</sup> Its natural anchorage and usual blanketing fog and rain made a perfect rallying area that eluded enemy detection. Paramishir Island (northern Kuriles) served as the springboard for the Imperial Army's attack on the Aleutian Islands on 8 June 1942 (the attack serving as a diversion to the main effort against Midway Island). Soon, however, American bombers (July 1943) and naval bombardment (February 1944) began to reduce the Kuriles to impotence and

eventually cut the islands entirely from the rest of Japan. Troop strength reached its zenith in August 1944 when 60,000 Japanese soldiers manned the island outposts. From that point until their invasion in August 1945, the garrisons were gradually reduced until 25,000 Imperial soldiers awaited the onslaught of either Russian or American forces.<sup>16</sup>

Long before any actual invasion of the Kuriles had even been considered, planning at the highest Allied levels had been conducted on how to dispense with a defeated Japan's territorial possessions. In a series of four summit meetings of the Allied heads of state, the fate of the Kuriles and all of Japan's outlying areas was sealed.

In late November 1943, President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill met in Cairo, Egypt, to parley their thoughts concerning the pursuance of the war against Japan and actions to be taken upon her defeat. A statement was issued by all parties on 1 December 1943 that expressly stated that Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadore Islands would be taken from Japan and returned to China. That was followed by, "Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed."<sup>17</sup> Although the statement did not directly name the Kurile Islands, it would have tremendous importance in weighing Soviet claims to the islands.

Leaving Cairo and Chiang Kai-shek, Roosevelt and Churchill proceeded to Teheran, Iran, to meet Soviet Premier Joseph

Stalin concerning the procedures for war and peace in the European Theatre. Although not among the primary topics of the meeting, the subject of the Kuriles was discussed between Roosevelt and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, with Roosevelt erroneously stating that the Kuriles had been taken from Russia by Japan in 1905 as a result of the Russo-Japanese War.<sup>18</sup> At the conference Roosevelt later suggested to Stalin that a joint military seizure of the Kuriles might be a productive move. Stalin ignored the suggestion because of his anxiety in the European Theatre. In late 1944 Stalin informed Averell Harriman, U.S. ambassador to Moscow, that as a price for Soviet participation in the war against Japan, all of Sakhalin Island and all of the Kurile Islands should be "returned" to the Soviet Union as a means of protecting her Far Eastern interests.<sup>19</sup> To the Allied leaders, the "return" of the Kuriles had become a legitimate claim.

The three leaders met again at Yalta in February 1945, for the purpose of reevaluating the war effort, agreeing on the conditions for Soviet participation in the war against Japan, and the general settlement at the cessation of hostilities. The secret portion of the agreement signed on 11 February 1945 (and not made public until 11 February 1946) that dealt with the Kurile Islands stated, "The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union."<sup>20</sup> Stalin had stated during the conference, "I only wanted to have returned to Russia what the Japanese have taken from my country."<sup>21</sup> And

Roosevelt, still under the mistaken impression that the Kuriles had been ripped away from Russia in 1905, heartily agreed to help "get back that which was taken from them."<sup>22</sup> Stalin had thus won the Kuriles through American misinformation and pre-occupation with more important matters. It was a masterpiece of Soviet political chicanery. The agreement at Yalta was regarded by the Russians as a total transfer of the islands, by the Americans as a promise to support Russian claims at a peace treaty, and by the Japanese as invalid because of their absence from deliberations.

Atomic bombs dropped on 6 and 9 August 1945 and the Soviet Union's declaration of war on 9 August necessitated the Japanese emperor's decision to end the war; in doing so, Japan had to accept the Potsdam (Conference of Berlin) Declaration that stated, among other stipulations, "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out, and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such adjacent minor islands as we determine."<sup>23</sup> Mongolia, Manchuria, and northern Korea were quickly occupied by Soviet troops; Sakhalin and the Kuriles were "liberated" on 17 August 1945. There was resistance from Japanese ground forces, but the entire archipelago was totally subdued by 4 September. With few exceptions, civilians on the islands had already abandoned their homes for the relative safety of Hokkaido, but military personnel were taken prisoner and interned as laborers in the Kuriles, Sakhalin, Kamchatka, and Siberia.<sup>24</sup>



#### F. SOVIET DOMINATION

The Soviets quickly solidified their hold on the islands. Russian civilian settlers began arriving in October and quickly confiscated the abandoned property. Soviet border guard units were also stationed on the islands. On 20 September 1945 the Soviets declared that the entire Kurile archipelago was now Russian territory, and the islands' occupants participated in the 1946 election of the Supreme Soviet.<sup>25</sup>

The Russians soon began to realize the intrinsic value of the Kuriles. The rich maritime resources, the canneries, and the docking facilities were, and are now, of immediate and lasting importance in providing food for all parts of the USSR. Seasonal workers, mostly students, have since been used in the summer months when fishing and canning operations are the heaviest. Tourists from the Soviet Far East are also drawn to the islands; the hot springs and warm beaches of Kunashir have made some of the islands resorts from the rigors of Siberia. But, of course, the primary importance of the Kuriles from the Soviet perspective has been the strategic positioning of the archipelago.

Post-war feelings concerning the Kuriles have consistently sparked deep emotions in both Japanese and Russians. After the secret agreement portion of the Yalta conference was made public in 1946, many Japanese were outraged and called for the return of the islands. This protest, identified by the Japanese as the Northern Territories issue, was soon generally

restricted to a demand for the return of the southern four islands of the chain (the Habomai group, Shikotan, Kunashir, and Iturup); these four had served as home for 90% of the Japanese that lived in the Kuriles.<sup>26</sup> The first Japanese government position paper on the subject was released in 1949; it stated that Yalta had no basis in international law and asserted Japanese claims over the four southern islands.<sup>27</sup>

During the San Francisco Peace Conference of 1951, Prime Minister Yoshida renounced the claims to the Kuriles that had so recently been enunciated.<sup>28</sup> The Japanese government later stated that Yoshida, when referring to the Kuriles, had meant the chain of islands from Urup Island northward to Kamchatka, but not the southern four islands because they were always inalienably Japanese.<sup>29</sup> The Soviet Union, though not a signatory of the peace treaty, used the Japanese position at San Francisco as another building block in their case for possession. The Japanese and the Russians continually debated the issue throughout the 1950's. The United States provided the Tokyo government a requested aide-memoire on 7 September 1956 supporting the Japanese position and their claims for the southern four islands.<sup>30</sup> However, during the Cold War era, this action probably did nothing more than solidify the positions of each side.

A peace declaration (not a peace treaty) was eventually signed between the Soviet Union and Japan on 19 October 1956, deferring the issue of the Northern Territories to the

conclusion of a permanent peace treaty and conceding the return of the Habomais and Shikotan upon consummation of the treaty.<sup>31</sup>

Later, the conditions for the return of the Habomais and Shikotan were expanded; on 27 January 1960 the Soviets stated that before the two islands would be returned, all foreign troops in Japan (meaning American) must permanently leave.<sup>32</sup>

The official return of Okinawa from the United States to Japan on 15 May 1972 signalled the concentration of all Japanese irredentist claims on the Kurile Islands. Government missions from the Japanese cabinet and the Diet have attempted to acquire Soviet concessions in returning the southern Kuriles; all efforts have been stone-walled by the Russians. Civic action groups and quasi-governmental missions to Moscow also have been fruitless. Indeed, the only response from Moscow has been the steady build-up of military forces and permanent facilities throughout the islands. The Japanese have countered by intensifying the campaign for the return of the Northern Territories and by declaring the 7th of February an annual day for protests and demonstrations in support of their claims.<sup>33</sup>

### III. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE KURILES

The strategic value of the Kurile Islands in the North-east Asia region has been widely recognized by all players, but an assessment of exactly what that value encompasses is in order. The Russians more than any other power were the earliest proponents of the Kurile's strategic worth; and since they are now the owners of the archipelago, an examination from their perspective should prove enlightening.

In the mid-18th century Russian naval officers had proposed establishment of a naval station as a guard for the eastern reaches of the empire and as a northern approach to Japan. Admiral Stepan O. Makarov, who extensively surveyed and mapped the Kurile straits, had expressed the idea in the late 1880's that the Kuriles were the key to communications between the Pacific Ocean and the Russian Far East.<sup>34</sup>

Marshall Stalin at the close of World War II spoke of their significance:

Henceforth, the Kurile Islands shall not serve as a means to cut off the Soviet Union from the ocean or as a base for a Japanese attack on our Far East, but as a means to link the Soviet Union with the ocean and as a defensive base against Japanese aggression.<sup>35</sup>

Subsequent Soviet leaders have been as unequivocal in their pronouncements of the key position played by the Kuriles in the geo-strategic projection and protection of Soviet power in the Pacific. The advancement of modern weapons technology has, if anything, increased their importance.

#### A. GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS

The Kuriles serve as an extension of Soviet power into Northeast Asia and the Pacific Ocean. They have been called by Soviet writers a "1000 kilometer Cossack saber" and a Russian "screen of steel."<sup>36</sup> They also serve as a concrete reminder, especially to the Japanese, that the Soviet Union is an Asian power, too, and plans to remain so. The Kuriles provide for a partial encirclement of Japan; especially vulnerable is the Japanese northern island of Hokkaido, potentially threatened by Soviet continental forces on the west, Sakhalin Island on the North, and the Kuriles on the east.

The Kuriles also are in a relatively good position to interdict air and sea lines of communication between Northeast Asia and the rest of the world, particularly the United States. The Soviets experienced this first-hand when, during World War II, Lend-Lease supply flows from the United States were restricted because of Japanese possession of the Kuriles. Soviet tenancy also graphically reminds the Japanese of their vulnerability as an insular nation and the potential threat that the Soviets pose to the severance of the strands of economic survivability.

#### B. NAVAL IMPORTANCE

From a naval perspective, the importance of the Kuriles can hardly be overestimated, for the value of the islands lies as much in their straits and adjacent waterways as in

the islands themselves. The Soviet Pacific Fleet is geographically choked in its access to and from the Soviet Far East and the Pacific Ocean. Out of the Sea of Japan into the Pacific or the Sea of Okhotsk or in carrying out the maritime replenishment of the base at Petropavlosk, Soviet naval forces must pass through one of three straits (Soya, Tsugaru, Tsushima), none of which they fully control. Although Japan has observed uninterrupted Soviet passage through the Soya and Tsugaru Straits by not extending territorial water claims and has viewed the Tsushima Strait as international waters, the potential for military closure of the straits in concert with the United States and/or another power is indeed a consideration for the Soviets.<sup>37</sup> In 1979, 320 Soviet naval vessels passed through one of these three straits (Soya-130, Tsugaru-50, Tsushima-140).<sup>38</sup> Moscow is 5000 miles from Vladivostok; the thin threads of overland transportation are tenuous and in need of support from Soviet maritime assets. Petropavlosk has no overland route and is totally dependent on maritime supply in its operation as a submarine base.

As stated previously, the naval value of the Kuriles is found as much in the twenty navigable straits as in the islands themselves by linking the Sea of Okhotsk, Sakhalin Island, and the Pacific Ocean. Now with possession of the Kuriles, Soviet vessels leaving the Sea of Japan through the Soya or Tsugaru Straits or leaving the Sea of Okhotsk can steam uninterrupted through the Kurile straits to the open ocean. Indeed, Russian

possession of the Kurile chain has made the Sea of Okhotsk a Soviet lake; unimpeded entry and egress from Okhotsk provides Soviet D-class SSBN's a relatively safe haven enabling the SS-N-18 nuclear warhead missile to target practically all of the continental United States and all East Asia with ample maneuver space to lessen their vulnerability.<sup>39</sup> Since most of the Pacific Fleet's submarines are based out of Petropavlosk, the Kuriles are critical for maintaining the umbilical between the home port, Okhotsk, and Vladivostok.

The Kuriles also provide the Soviets with excellent harbors, ports, and rendezvous areas for staging naval operations. As mentioned before, Iturup's Hitokappu Bay was the marshalling area for Admiral Nagumo's carrier task forces enroute to Pearl Harbor. Simushir's (central Kuriles) Buroton Bay, shrouded by fog, protected from bad weather, and easily accessible to the Pacific provides an excellent submarine base. Although other areas in the Soviet Maritime Provinces, North Korea, and Kamchatka also provide adequate facilities, the fact that these Kurile stations are ice-free year-round makes them even more valuable.

#### C. AIR IMPORTANCE

Stationing of air forces on the Kuriles has given the Soviets platforms for sophisticated electronic surveillance of parts of Japan and the United States Seventh Fleet. In any conflict involving the Soviet Union and Japan or the United States, Kurile-based aircraft would be heavily

utilized in the battle for air superiority and for interdicting Japanese air lines of communication with outside forces.

Soviet island-based aircraft also extend the effectiveness of her naval forces. Being, at least for now, an anti-carrier, anti-submarine (ASW), and, in relation to the United States Navy, a nonautonomous force, the Soviet Navy is, to a heavy degree, dependent on land-based aircraft.<sup>40</sup> Although steps have been taken by the Soviets to rectify this problem by stationing the ASW carrier Minsk in the Pacific Fleet and development of an American-style catapult carrier, until the problem is solved the Kuriles will remain an important element in providing air cover and extending ASW capabilities.<sup>41</sup> The presence of TU-22M (Backfire) bombers in the region, capable of staging from the Kuriles, presents Japanese and American planners with difficult problems for air defense throughout the North Pacific.

#### D. GROUND IMPORTANCE

If contemplated by the Soviets, the Kuriles could become an excellent platform for staging an assault on Hokkaido. Amphibious assault, parachute drop, heliborne assault, or a mechanized thrust across the 17 kilometer frozen channel (winter only) separating Kunashir from Point Notsuke on Hokkaido are all possibilities that are feasible through Soviet possession of the Kuriles. Short of all-out invasion



of Hokkaido or other parts of Japan, the islands provide Soviet ground forces the geographic opportunity to seize and hold selected land areas bordering the important maritime straits or striking at selected Japanese Self Defense Force (SDF) sites considered to be necessary. Quick strike operations against the northern tip of Hokkaido to secure the Soya Strait, against the Shiretoko Peninsula (eastern Hokkaido), or against the Nemuro Peninsula (opposite the Habomais) to protect the Kunashir Channel could be effectively launched from the Kurile Islands.

#### E. INTELLIGENCE IMPORTANCE

The Kuriles provide a vantage point for monitoring maritime traffic in and out of the Sea of Okhotsk through the Kunashir Channel; air traffic leaving and entering Japan is also easily tracked. As mentioned, Soviet intelligence-gathering aircraft are stationed on the Kuriles. The Soviet KGB office located on the island of Kunashir has established an apparatus for examining Japanese newspapers, periodicals, and other articles of information obtained from Japan.<sup>42</sup>

#### IV. THE ARGUMENTS FOR POSSESSION OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES

With a basic knowledge of the historical development of the Kurile Islands, a closer examination of the claims of each side is in order. Although there is no unanimous opinion in Japan as to exactly which islands the "Northern Territories" involves, there is, as will be seen, general agreement that the southern four islands (the Habomais, Shikotan, Kunashir, and Iturup) must be returned to Japan. Because they represent the most intense (and most realistic) focus of the Japanese argument and represent the Japanese government's official target for return, the analysis of the Japanese claims will be confined to the southern four islands, hereafter referred to as the Northern Territories.

##### A. THE RUSSIAN SIDE

The Soviet claims are based on World War II agreements (Cairo, Yalta, and Potsdam), the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, and the de facto military situation at the conclusion of hostilities in 1945. The case for Soviet possession of the Kuriles consists of the following:<sup>43</sup>

- 1) Early discovery of the Kuriles was accomplished by Russian explorers and traders. As early as 1632 Russians were trading with the Ainu inhabitants of the Kuriles, before any of the natives had even heard of a place called Japan.

2) Later, in the mid-1700's, the southern Kurile Ainu welcomed the Russians as liberators from the "oppressive" Japanese.

3) In the years of 1766 to 1769 the Russians first collected tribute from the Ainu on Iturup and Kunashir Islands and in 1770 the Ainu on the Kuriles from Urup Island northward were claimed as subjects of the Russian Tsar.

4) The Shimoda and St. Petersburg Treaties were negated by Japanese aggression in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.

5) The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of 1941 was nullified by Japan when it aided German aggression against the Soviet Union.

6) The Soviet Union did endorse the Atlantic Charter concept of non-territorial aggression, but it added its own qualifications that excluded territories such as the Kuriles from its policy.

7) The Cairo Declaration denied all territory to Japan gained by violence or greed. Since the Yalta agreement handing the Kuriles to the Soviets is based on the concepts of the Cairo meeting, the Allied powers recognized that the Kuriles had been illegally seized by the Japanese and rightfully belong to the Soviet Union.

8) In attacking the Kuriles in 1945 and occupying the islands, the Soviet Union was fulfilling solemn agreements consummated at Yalta and Potsdam. The Kuriles were bought and paid for with Soviet blood.

9) The Kurile Islands issue was settled once and for all by the agreements reached at Yalta and Potsdam. These agreements were subscribed to by all the Allied powers, not just the Soviet Union.

10) When Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration, she formally renounced her claims to the Kuriles. This renunciation was cemented when Japan accepted the conditions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951. Even though the Soviet Union was not a signatory of the peace treaty itself, Japan signed the treaty and is legally bound by its provisions.

11) The Habomais, Shikotan, Kunashir, and Iturup have, despite Japanese revisionist protests, been part of the Kurile chain of islands. The Japanese tactic of trying to separate these four islands from the rest of the Kuriles is a thinly veiled attempt at deception.

12) As far as the Habomais and Shikotan are concerned, the renewal of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty in 1960 negated the pledge of the Soviet Union to return the islands at the conclusion of a peace treaty.

13) Continued assertion of Japanese ownership of the islands is merely anti-Soviet neo-militarism forwarded by revanchist Japanese who are opposed to favorable relations with the Soviet Union. The Japanese people understand that the issue is settled; only those interested in stirring-up anti-Soviet sentiment revive the issue of the so-called "Northern Territories."

## B. THE JAPANESE SIDE

The Japanese claim that the Northern Territories are historically, legally, and culturally part of Japan.<sup>44</sup> The Northern Territories are considered "inalienable" Japanese lands and command a considerable backing by the government and the public for their return.

The explanation for claiming Shikotan Island and the Habomais Island group is the assertion that these islands have always been part of Hokkaido; at no time have they been considered or been identified with any part of the Kuriles. The Japanese point to the Soviet concession in the 1956 Joint Peace Declaration (that the Habomais and Shikotan would be returned at the conclusion of a peace treaty) as proof of Soviet acknowledgement that these islands are separate from the questions of Kurile ownership and have always been part of the four main Japanese islands. Thus, as the argument goes, the Habomais and Shikotan are not even to be negotiated at a peace treaty conference; when the Potsdam Declaration was accepted by Japan, and she was restricted to the four main islands and "minor islands" to be determined, the Habomais and Shikotan were without question to remain part of Japan. From Japanese eyes, only Russian aggrandizement has imprisoned these two into the world of the Northern Territories.

The case for Japanese rights to Kunashir and Iturup are considerably more involved but still based on the claim that these, too, have always been Japanese lands, subject

only to jurisdictional control of Japan. The Japanese, in building their case, present the following points:

1) 17th century maps of both Japan and Russia depict the Kurile Islands as belonging to Japan.

2) The Matsumae clan of Hokkaido developed Kunashir and Iturup through trade with the Ainu inhabitants.

3) The Tokugawa shogunate finally incorporated Iturup and Kunashir into the Hokkaido province in 1800. No Russians had ever exercised any control over these two islands.

4) A Russian Imperial Ordinance of 4 September 1821 stating that Russian navigational and communications rights extended only as far south as Urup Island is factual evidence that the Russians never controlled any part of the Northern Territories.

5) The Treaty of Shimoda (1855) firmly established the boundaries in the Kurile Islands; the Russians formally recognized that Kunashir and Iturup belonged to Japan.

6) From the 18th century, Iturup and Kunashir had been administered as an integral part of the Japanese Islands, not as a colony such as Sakhalin.

7) By the precepts of the Atlantic Charter, which was agreed to at least in principle by all of the Allied powers, a policy of territorial non-expansion was to be followed upon conclusion of the hostilities of World War II.

8) As a result of the Cairo Conference (1943), the Allies again stated to "have no thought of territorial expansion";

Japan was to relinquish all territory "taken by violence and greed." This, of course, could not apply to Kunashir and Iturup or any other part of the Kuriles. The Shimoda and St. Petersburg Treaties peacefully determined the possession of these islands; thus, none of the Northern Territories can be denied Japan as a result of the Cairo Declaration.

9) The Yalta Agreement and its dictate to have the Kuriles "handed back to the Soviet Union" has no legal basis; Japan was not a party to the deliberations, which were secret, and thus not legally bound by its provisions. Anyway, the Yalta Agreement was merely a statement of objectives by three heads of state and not internationally sanctioned directives. Changes of territory can only occur as a result of a peace treaty between the belligerents.

10) Soviet actions at Yalta were in contradiction to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact which assures the territorial integrity and nonaggression of each power. The pact was to have remained in effect until April 1946 but was unilaterally broken by the Soviet actions at Yalta, Potsdam, and the Russian declaration of war on Japan.

11) The Potsdam Declaration, accepted by Japan, restricted postwar Japan to the four main islands and such minor islands as were to be determined by the Allies; this, in accordance with the statements of non-territorial expansion, means that Iturup and Kunashir were to remain Japanese. The status of the islands of the Northern Territories must be settled in a peace treaty.

12) At the end of World War II, some 16,000 Japanese civilians inhabited the Northern Territories; until the end of the war, no Russian had ever resided in the Northern Territories.

13) The incorporation of the contested islands into the Soviet Union are unilateral actions taken as a result of Soviet aggrandizement and have no basis in international law.

14) At the San Francisco Peace Conference (1951) Japan renounced all titles and claims to the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin, except Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, or the Habomais as they had never been part of the Kuriles. That surfaces the question of what are the Kuriles. The term Kuriles has been defined twice in international treaties prior to 1945 (Shimoda and St. Petersburg) as meaning the islands running from Shumshu in the north to Urup in the south. None of the four contested islands have ever been considered as being part of the Kurile Islands.

15) As for Japan renouncing claims to the Kuriles at San Francisco, in no way can the Soviet Union claim any part of the Northern Territories on that basis, as the USSR refused to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

16) Not until the Soviet Union and Japan negotiate a peace treaty will the final disposition of the islands be determined. Until then, contrary to Soviet protestations, the issue is not closed.



Both sides believe in their right to the islands and have built their cases to support their contentions. More important than the legalisms involved are the foundations for the convictions and motivations for the two governments' positions (Chapter V and VI).

## V. THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

The Northern Territories, from the Soviet perspective, are a continuation of the Russian concern for the security of the nation. The bitter experiences of war, invasion, and foreign intervention have led the Russians to seek territorial buffers to protect the heartland. Although possessing some intrinsic wealth, the Northern Territories and their value to the Soviets are an extension of this desire to shield the state and its people. The Soviets, in congruence with the pursuit of security, have attempted to use the Northern Territories to enhance their political and economic situation in the Far East.

### A. THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF THEIR TERRITORY

One of the sources of the seemingly insoluble nature of the Northern Territories problem has been the divergent viewpoints held by the Russians and the Japanese concerning the concept of national territory. The officialdom of the USSR has tended to regard (as did their imperial predecessors) the Soviet lands outlying the Great Russian homeland as being peripheral to the heart and soul of Russia, and thus an area to be dominated for the protection of the Great Russian center. The Kuriles are viewed as a legitimate wartime expansion of this protective ring.

# 1. The Territorial Concept

The physical boundaries of what we call Russia or the Soviet Union were not intrinsically important to the Muscovy court culture since its emergence in the 13th century anymore than they are to the current leadership in the Kremlin today.<sup>45</sup> Certainly boundaries and the extension of the empire are important political objectives of the leadership and the people, but the buffer areas surrounding the Russian heartland are not considered inviolable Russian territory. Just as the Muscovy court concerned itself with the maintenance of clan supremacy and security as all-important, so does the Great Russian ethnic group today view itself as the vibrant heartland of the Soviet Union; and outlying areas exist to protect the heart. Lacking natural boundaries, survival has depended on expansion. Outlying buffer areas have been viewed as being elastic - expanding and contracting in concert with the varying conditions bearing upon the nation.<sup>46</sup> The elastic nature of the state has been exacerbated by the presence of countless ethnic minorities, foreign pressures and invasions, and internal strife.

There evokes from the Soviet leadership no strong concept of inherent territory for the outlying areas. The geographical influences dictate their stance on territorial expansion, and thus the buffer areas. The "defenseless steppes" have taught the lesson that shielding the heart is a matter fixed only by military power.<sup>47</sup> The Russian influence

in East Europe, Afghanistan, Vietnam, North Korea, India, and Mongolia is the manifestation, in varying degrees, of the preoccupation (some say paranoia) of "expand or die." The Kuriles, including the Northern Territories, are a continuation of the desire to expand the empire, for by doing so the heart is protected to an even greater degree.

The Kuriles are not considered by any contingent of Russians to be inherent Russian territory; the Soviets privately acknowledge that their historical claims to the islands are weak. They make their claims based upon a desire to obtain a sustainable outlet to the Pacific; to pressure and influence the action in Japan, China, and all of the Far East; to depend on expansion as the best security policy; and to reap the rewards of victorious Soviet military engagements.

## 2. A Result of War

Commensurate with the belief in expanding national boundaries is the Soviet contention that the Northern Territories are their legitimate prize for their World War II involvement, a recognized part of the spoils of war, and part of the Soviet Union by right of conquest. In 1973 the then chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet stated to a visiting Japanese delegation, in reference to the Northern Territories, that "those who want to alter the present boundaries, which the Soviets gained by the sacrifice of the blood of 20 million people, must be ready for the Third World War."<sup>48</sup>

Russian officials add that all the Northern Territories campaigns and demonstrations by the Japanese cannot simply cancel the reality of the results of World War II. They wonder by what right do Japanese revanchists have to attempt to subvert a situation that was authenticated not only by the signatures and seals of international agreement (Cairo, Yalta, Potsdam, and San Francisco), but also by the blood of the Russian people.<sup>49</sup> Consequently, Soviet officials have urged the Japanese to acknowledge the "effective rule" of the territories they have presided over for the last three and a half decades.<sup>50</sup>

When the Soviets argue that the post-war territorial status quo must be maintained, they are arguing for a continuation of their opportunistic policy of military expansion, an expansion they accept as totally legitimate.

### 3. Pandora's Box

A problem transcending the Northern Territories issue is that of the territorial claims levied against the Russians by other nation-states and ethnic minorities within the Soviet Union. For the Soviets to compromise on the Northern Territories dispute would be to open themselves to claims by Eastern Europeans, the Chinese, the Finns, and their own ethnic minorities (Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Kazaks, Uzbeks, etc.).

Many of the statements by Soviet officials voicing an unrelenting stance in refusing to discuss any territorial

problem with the Japanese have been intended for other ears (notably Chinese) in an effort to demonstrate the futility of making revanchist claims against the Soviet Union.<sup>51</sup> In stating "the Soviet Union has no intention of transferring to Japan a single piece of stone, let alone an island," the Soviet ambassador to Japan, Dimitrii Polyansky, was continuing the rhetorical notification to all concerned that prospects of the USSR returning anyone's claimed lands are bleak and can in no case be decided anywhere other than in the Kremlin.<sup>52</sup>

As concerns the Northern Territories, the Russians view the Japanese claims as being wholly unrealistic. Whereas German Chancellor Willy Brandt, in closing the book on territorial claims between the Federal Republic of Germany on one hand and the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic on the other hand, "sacrificed" 114,000 square kilometers and a population of 9.6 million people, the Japanese will not forget 5,000 square kilometers and 16,000 homeless Japanese refugees.<sup>53</sup> The Soviet actions in Europe and Asia after World War II followed the established procedures for victors in war; Japan's attempt to rewrite the understood rules cannot be allowed. And in order to reduce the potential problems of territorial claims, both active and dormant, the Soviets have taken the course of action of simply refusing to acknowledge the existence of any territorial claims. As an Isvestia commentator recently stated:

The Soviet principled stand is that any attempt to change territorial status since the end of World War II would be categorically rejected. We have spent thirty years making Europe understand this, and we cannot maintain such a stand and then negate it. The stand of maintaining post-World War II political and geographical boundaries is equally applicable to Asia.<sup>54</sup>

#### 4. Public Opinion

Though not known as a regime that pays an abnormal amount of attention to public opinion, the leaders of the Kremlin are in their own way responsive to public sentiment, especially when it coincides with state and party objectives. The Russian people have been led to believe in the historical record that the Kuriles, including the Northern Territories, belong to the Soviet Union. The Russian citizen who is cognizant of the dispute has been brought up to believe that in no sense can the Northern Territories be regarded as age-old Japanese lands.<sup>55</sup> Broadcasts, school curriculum, museum exhibits, and libraries in the Soviet Far East enhance the patriotic attachment to the islands. Any attempt to return the Northern Territories to the Japanese would cause the Soviet leadership to contend with the sentiments of a populace that suffered 20 million deaths during the Great Patriotic War, a public that would loathe the returning of anything to the "untrustworthy" Japanese.

Another consideration for change in the status quo would be the disposition of the current Kurile Island residents. Many of the inhabitants are veterans of the 1945 Kurile campaign. They and their descendants have repeatedly

been guaranteed their domicile on the islands as a reward for their sacrifices.<sup>56</sup> A final consideration would be the position taken by the Soviet military leadership to any territorial change. Given the strategic value of the southern Kuriles, they would certainly be against the reversion of the islands to the Japanese. This was clearly alluded to in a 20 January 1960 Pravda article by the Soviet Far Eastern Military District commander when he said that the Soviet people would find it difficult to understand why the Northern Territories should be handed over to Japan, a statement intended as much for the Kremlin civilian leaders as for the Japanese.<sup>57</sup>

As part of the Russian preoccupation with maintenance of its security through expanding buffer areas, as an opening wedge for other territorial claims, and as a subject for public scrutiny, the Northern Territories issue would appear from the Soviet perspective to be forever settled. Innumerable Soviet officials have so stated. The Soviet ambassador to Japan has repeatedly stated to all Japanese who would listen that the USSR would never consent to any change in its borders and that it has no intention of changing the post-war reality. And yet, in the past the Soviet Union has made territorial concessions in the interests of good relations with other nations. In returning the Soviet zone in Austria, the Porkkala naval base in Finland, and Port Arthur and Dairen in China, the Russians have shown that where political expedience and influence are to be gained, positions can change.<sup>58</sup>



However, the more prevalent Soviet attitude has been a refusal to even consider such a course of action. A final reflection on the territorial dimension of the Northern Territories dispute is the Soviet belief that time is on their side. The longer the status quo is maintained, the greater the conclusiveness of Soviet ownership. Soviet leaders profess to believe that the day will come when Japan will be resigned to the present situation.

#### B. INTRINSIC INTERESTS IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES

The Northern Territories do have their own intrinsic value for the Soviets. Fishing resources, mineral extractions, military uses, weather stations, and even tourism are some of the inherent benefits realized by possession of the four island group. By asserting ownership over the islands and the accompanying territorial waters, the Russians have, in no small measure, extended their economic and strategic assets.

##### 1. Economic Benefits

Maritime resource industries are the most important part of the Northern Territories economic contributions to the USSR. The waters adjacent to the southern Kuriles account for fully one-third of all Russian fishing catches.<sup>59</sup> The Soviet Union is the second largest fish-consuming nation in the world (Japan is number one). Herring, cod, salmon, crab, and whales are the most abundant types found in the confluence of the cold Okhotsk and warm Pacific waters. Iturup, with

what is believed to be the largest salmon hatchery in the world, produces more red caviar than any other spot in the USSR.<sup>60</sup> Shikotan is the main base for the Russian Pacific whaling fleet with two whale processing plants on Iturup. Shikotan is also the Soviet home base for its Pacific crab industry with approximately 1.6 million tins being canned annually from its three modern canneries.<sup>61</sup> Akar-feltia (a form of red algae) is also harvested from Kurile waters and used as a nutrient medium and emulsifier in food, textiles, paper, tanning, and pharmaceutical products. Kelp is gathered in the waters of the Northern Territories and is used as a glue substitute in textile manufacturing. With the global epidemic of the imposition of the 200-mile maritime economic zones by most nations, the waters around the southern Kuriles take on even greater significance.<sup>62</sup>

It is also interesting to note that the maritime industries around the Northern Territories provide employment for approximately 15,000 seasonal workers, many of them students from the western regions of the Soviet Union. Additionally, the Soviets collect sizeable revenues from Japanese fishermen in the form of licensing and tonnage taxes; for example, in 1980 the Russians collected \$17.4 million just for Japanese catches of salmon and sea trout in the waters surrounding the Northern Territories.<sup>63</sup>

Minerals are extracted from the Northern Territories for various uses throughout the Soviet Union. Bauxite,

zircanium, gold, zinc, mercury, tin, tungsten, lead, and copper exist on the islands but are, in many cases, unexploited due to inaccessibility and neglect. Sulfur deposits on Kunashir and Iturup are mined and shipped to Sakhalin to be used in cellulose production. Pumice and perlite are extracted for use in construction materials and road-building. Titanium-magnetic sands are dredged from offshore Iturup for utilization in the aircraft, shipbuilding, and chemical industries situated in the Amur River valley.<sup>64</sup>

Though not nearly as developed as the maritime or mineral resources of the Northern Territories, agriculture and animal husbandry have been steadily developing. The normal crops grown in many parts of the Soviet Union (cabbage, turnips, radishes, carrots, beans, tobacco, etc.) are present as are the more exotic types (watermelons and tomatoes) due to the relatively warm climatic conditions. Pigs, sheep, and horses populate most all settlements, and dairy collectives have been established.

The severe swings in climatic change and geological instability of the Northern Territories may prove to be a blessing in disguise. The volcanism and cold water within close proximity of each other provide an ideal opportunity for the utilization of geothermal power. Previously, the Japanese residents of the islands used Kunashir's "hot beaches" for heating their homes and food. Now the Soviets have constructed a geothermal power plant on Kunashir which

produces the majority of electrical power for the island.<sup>65</sup> As fossil fuels and other forms of energy become more costly, the geothermal resources of the Northern Territories will continue to provide cheap, inexhaustible energy for the future.

By the 1960's the Soviets had discovered that the Northern Territories were an excellent location for vacation retreats from the harsh realities of Siberia and the Soviet Far East. Kunashir attracts the greatest amount of tourists, limited only to Soviet citizens. Its exotic plant life (bamboo, magnolia, etc.) and sulphurous baths on the "hot beaches" attract thousands of visitors each year. A health resort, sanatorium, and other facilities on Kunashir produces a long waiting list of hopefuls. And although the Japanese picture the Kuriles as remote northern lands, Kunashir has been called the "Kurile Crimea."

## 2. Strategic Benefits

Mention should be made of the strategic importance of the four island group of the Northern Territories as opposed to the whole archipelago. The southern four contain the two largest islands in the chain (Iturup and Kunashir) and account for roughly one-half of the land area of the entire island chain. The naval, air, ground, and intelligence missions of the Soviet forces in the Kuriles vis-a-vis Japan is best performed from these outposts. The natural harbors in Kunashir (Tomari Bay and Furukamappu), Iturup (Shana,

Skamanbe, Mayoro, and Hitokappu) and Shikotan (Anama, Shikotan, and Matsugahama) are among the best in the Kuriles. The air and ground missions are undoubtedly enhanced by their proximity to the Japanese homeland, as are the reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering efforts. Additionally, the Kunashir Channel (separating Kunashir and Iturup) is the primary waterway used by the Soviets when sailing between the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Okhotsk. So the guts of the Soviet military presence in the Kuriles is situated in the Northern Territories. Curiously enough, the Habomais island group has not been the object of any military buildup. It has evidently been deemed unsuitable for military airfields, has no natural harbors, and is too small for any sizeable troop concentrations.

Weather stations are also present in the Northern Territories, as is a considerable KGB operation on Kunashir. The KGB, while involved in the more mundane intelligence work of gathering and deciphering the latest Japanese print material, also make a considerable effort to gain intelligence from Japanese fishermen in the area. In exchange for the right to fish in usually restricted waters, the Japanese provide the KGB shore patrols with information concerning prominent Hokkaido residents (the local police chief, Self Defense Force officials, and leaders of the Northern Territories campaign groups) and movements of the Japanese Self Defense Force elements.<sup>66</sup> Japanese fishermen apprehended while poaching in Soviet-controlled waters are particularly inviting targets for this type of activity.

### C. TARGET: JAPAN

Other than the economic and strategic benefits derived by the Soviets in possessing the southern Kuriles, the Russians have used the Northern Territories problem to influence, pressure, cajole, and even extort the Japanese into situations more advantageous to Soviet power primacy in East Asia. Many strategic analysts believe that the Soviets own most of the trump cards in the Japanese-Soviet relationship: links with the Japanese Communist Party, natural resources and markets desired by the Japanese, the military muscle to back up their actions, and without the weight of adhering to diplomatic niceties. And thus the Northern Territories issue is a reflection of the supremacy of the Soviet position. Other observers consider the Russians' dealings with Japan, especially as it pertains to the Northern Territories, as being a classic example of Soviet diplomatic ineptitude. Whatever the verdict, the territorial problem, while presenting a continuing conundrum, provides the Soviets with a certain amount of leverage over the Japanese.

#### 1. Historical Distrust

Though many Japanese may regard their country as vulnerable, incapable of belligerent acts, and militarily impotent, the Soviets do not share that view. Historical relations between the two had been fairly good up until the end of the 19th century; territorial problems were peacefully settled in the Treaty of Shimoda (1855) and the Treaty

of St. Petersburg (1875). But trouble began in 1891 with the initiation of construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad; completed in 1903, the railroad signalled the intent of Russia to become a power in a region that the Japanese considered to be in their vital interest. The last decade of the 19th century and the first of the 20th century witnessed the Russian concoction of the Triple Intervention in the Liaotung Peninsula controversy of 1895, Russian attempts to solidify their position in Korea, and ultimately the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The Japanese participation in the Allied intervention in Siberia (1918-1922), the Japanese Manchurian expansion (1931), and the Japanese-Soviet border clashes in Manchuria (1938-1939) were all further manifestations of the bilateral animosities.

The Soviet declaration of war on Japan and seizure of the Kurile Islands in 1945 (despite the existence of a Neutrality Pact still in force), the forced labor and deaths of Japanese prisoners of war, and Soviet attempts to extend their influence within post-war Japan have cemented the distrust the Japanese have for the Russians and vice versa. Technically, the Soviet Union and Japan are still in a state of war. No peace treaty ending the Second World War between the USSR and Japan has been signed. In 1956 they did sign a Joint Declaration of Peace to terminate hostilities, settle war reparations, and establish diplomatic relations.<sup>67</sup> The consummation of a peace treaty has been delayed by the

Japanese demand for the return of the Northern Territories as a prerequisite for peace treaty negotiations and the Soviet refusal to discuss the issue.

More recently, the sanctification of the US-Japan Defense Treaty, increased Japanese military expenditures, the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, and the rejection of Brezhnev's proposed Asian Collective Security Plan are graphic examples of what the Russian leaders see as the potential for a Japanese return to a policy of militaristic expansionism.

As part of this distrust of Japanese intentions, the Soviets are not convinced that even if some degree of concessions are given in the Northern Territories the Japanese will not press for the broader demands for the remainder of the Kuriles and the southern part of Sakhalin Island.<sup>68</sup> In that respect, it may be better from the Soviet perspective to consolidate their hold on the islands and wait out the Japanese.

The Soviets also cite the Northern Territories reversion demonstrations and campaigns as manifestations of the confrontational nature of the Japanese "anti-Soviet ruling clique."<sup>69</sup> They are convinced that without substantial change in the attitudes of the Japanese leaders and the continued strategic alignment of the Japanese in an anti-Soviet block with the United States and China, there is no incentive or wisdom in making any territorial concessions.



## 2. Japan's Helplessness

The Soviet military buildup in the Northern Territories and the heavy-handed nature in dealing with the Japanese desires to discuss the issue highlight the relative helplessness that Japan experiences in trying to deal with the Russians. The Soviets continually emphasize the inferior position of the Japanese in the southern Kurile question and in their relationship as a whole.<sup>70</sup>

As recently as the early 1970's there appeared to be strong possibilities for solving the territorial problem. In January 1972 Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko arrived in Tokyo with the offer of a possible compromise. The speculation was that Gromyko offered the return of Shikotan and the Habomais in exchange for the renunciation of any claims to Kunashir and Iturup, Japanese promises of economic development in Siberia, and Japanese adherence to the Brezhnev proposal (1969) for an Asian collective security pact (an instrument designed to diplomatically and politically isolate the Chinese).<sup>71</sup> But because of Nixon's impending visit to the PRC and all that implied for Sino-Japanese relations and the political impossibility of Prime Minister Sato dealing away the two big islands, the offer was rebuffed.

Subsequent to Gromyko's trip, world events seemed to turn in Moscow's favor. The SALT I Treaty (1972), U.S. forces withdrawn from Vietnam (1973), and the Arab petroleum embargo of the western nations were all landmark events that augured

for increased Soviet global influence. With the oil embargo came new Soviet perceptions of Japan's strength. Japan had represented a strong economic giant, able to supply the Russians with technology, capital, and advanced industrial techniques necessary to develop Soviet resources, a nation to be handled with considerable care. But the energy crisis graphically demonstrated to the Soviets the vulnerable nature of the Japanese economy - an insular nation dependent on outside resources and markets.

The Soviets also believe that relations with Japan should develop at the pace dictated by the Kremlin and that Japan should have to make the adjustments, not themselves. Japan currently presents no security threat to the Soviet Union. Additionally, it is felt that Japan, in aligning itself with the Western economies, will suffer the same recession and depression cycles "inherent" in a capitalist system and that the Japanese people will, out of necessity, demand closer relations with the USSR.<sup>72</sup>

Japan's vulnerability to the armed strength of the Soviet Union is also frequently emphasized by the Soviet rhetoric. The military build-up in the Northern Territories is an excellent example. In a rather indiscreet disclosure, a Russian diplomat laughingly boasted to a Japanese newsman that a Soviet invasion of Japan "would take only several tens of minutes if we did it in real earnest."<sup>73</sup> Japan Defense Agency (JDA) officials have noted that Russian

military exercises in and around the southern Kuriles are rehearsals for the type of activity that would be taken during an invasion of Japan.<sup>74</sup> Verbal threats are sometimes more direct, as illustrated by a Soviet general's recent remark that any attempt by Japan to settle the territorial issue by force "would naturally lead to war, which would be unnecessary and dangerous to Japan."<sup>75</sup>

The Northern Territories issue also allows the Soviet Union the opportunity to influence Japanese public opinion concerning Japanese-Soviet relations. A Radio Moscow broadcast (22 January 1981), as an indicator of Soviet sentiments, stated that the anti-Soviet nature of the Northern Territories campaigns and demonstrations have been perpetrated by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the conservative ruling party in Japan, as an instrument of neo-militarism.<sup>76</sup> This neo-militarism is cited by the Russians as being of the same type that caused the Pacific War and, if pursued by the Japanese, will have the same results. A recent Izvestia article related that the revanchist campaigns have:

.... gained nothing on this path in the past and will not cover itself with laurels in the future unless the initiators of this malicious campaign calm down. Putting an end to it is in Japan's own interests.<sup>77</sup>

And another Izvestia article puts the problem directly to the Japanese people:

Japan is now faced with many difficult and real problems requiring attention both within the country and in the foreign sphere. It is also a fact that many ordinary Japanese weighing-up these problems unhesitatingly oppose attempts to fan an unseemly propaganda campaign around the so-called "territorial issue" while the Japanese peoples' real needs and interests are relegated to the background and consigned to oblivion.<sup>78</sup>

Russian reminders also highlight the delicate nature of the Japanese economy. As the Soviets are quick to observe, Japan's economy, which is dependent on foreign trade, necessitates the development of peaceful trade and economic cooperation with its neighbors and "cannot afford to slide back onto the path of confrontation and defeat."<sup>79</sup>

Soviet leaders also point to the unrealistic nature of the Japanese claims. The West Germans abandoned their revanchist claims after realization of the Soviet power and desire to retain the status quo of the post-war world. The Russians are incredulous at the continual harping of the Japanese about a small group of islands that were lost over thirty-six years ago; but the Soviets are comforted by the fact that the Japanese are helpless to force any changes.

### 3. Linkages

The Soviets had hoped that the territorial problem with Japan would have faded away after a sufficient amount of time had elapsed and the Japanese were able to swallow their pride and accept the de facto situation. But to the contrary, recent public and media attention and government support for the islands' return has become even stronger.

The Russians, in turn, have attempted to utilize the Northern Territories problem to exact economic and political benefits while preventing the Japanese from doing the same. The Soviets preach that linking the territorial issue with other areas is dangerous for Japanese-Soviet relations, but they use the same linkage strategy themselves when gains are to be made. Former Soviet Premier Alexi Kosygin made that clear, as have others, when he said that continued revanchist Japanese claims "will no doubt affect other problems."<sup>80</sup>

Faced with Tokyo's adamant stance, Russian leaders have offered to improve economic, scientific, cultural, and diplomatic ties with Japan in the hope that strong ties (especially economic) between the two will help remove what time has not. In fact, the current hopes of the Soviet leadership for closer relations with the Japanese are almost entirely focused on economic enticements, giving Japan a stronger incentive to move toward a more balanced position in its global alignment. The Soviet perception of the Japanese economy being dependent on international trade is coupled with the notion that the future will bring greater trade frictions with the United States and Western Europe, all of which will lead the Japanese to seek the raw materials, markets, and investment opportunity that the Soviet Union possesses. One need only recall the Gromyko offer of 1972 as an example of Soviet attempts to transfer these perceptions into political leverage over Japan. As concerns the

Northern Territories, the Russians warn Japanese officials that "linking of Siberian development and the so-called 'territorial issue' hurts Japan-USSR relations."<sup>81</sup> Then when it serves their purposes, "The first casualties of a policy hostile to the Soviet Union, the so-called 'territorial issue', could be cultural, scientific, and technical links, mutual relations in the sphere, and trade and economic cooperation."<sup>82</sup> In other words, linkage is acceptable if it is made by the Kremlin.

Fishing is an area that has witnessed a linkage with the Northern Territories issue. With Japan's defeat in World War II, the Japanese lost the right to fish in Russian waters that it had won as a result of the Russo-Japanese War. And Japan also lost the very rich waters around the Northern Territories. As the world's greatest fish-consuming nation, this was a disastrous blow to the industry. The lack of adequate fishing resources in the Northeast Asia region for feeding their people has led to the establishment of sophisticated Japanese and Soviet fishing fleets that reach out to global fishing grounds, but the problems in the Northeast Asia region remained. Because of contrived arguments, seizure of Japanese fishing boats by Soviet patrol craft, and a general deterioration between the two nations, there was a realization that an agreement concerning the fishing problem would be necessary. On 27 May 1977, after much negotiating, the Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Agreement was signed. The

Japanese were compelled to accept catch limits, operating licenses, on-board inspections, and other regulations as the price for fishing in Russian zones. As it stands now, Japanese-Soviet delegations each year establish annual limits that each nation's fishermen may take from the others waters. The fishing accords have become an extension of the Northern Territories dispute; they have been used by both sides to substantiate their claims to the southern Kuriles. Moscow has been afraid that if concessions for fishing rights are given around the Kuriles it will strengthen Japanese irredentist claims. Conversely, the Japanese have been reluctant to pay fees for the use of the waters for fear of cementing the de facto situation. Since the advent of the 200-mile offshore economic zones some four years ago, the fishing areas around the Kuriles have become more important. The Soviets contend that the only result of the Japanese territorial claims has been "trouble" in settling the more important fishing issues and that they are all fundamentally part of the overall relationship. As reported in Sovetskaya Rossiya:

The Japanese side frequently resorts to the thesis that politics is politics and fishing is fishing. It supports development of ties with the USSR in this sphere and the further stabilization and switch-over to a long-term footing. However, can this aspect be separated from the overall system of Soviet-Japanese relations?<sup>83</sup>

Other threats are less subtle. On 11 September 1976 the former Japanese Foreign Minister Miyazawa made a long-range "inspection" of the Northern Territories aboard a

Maritime Safety Agency patrol boat as a prelude to talks he was to hold with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. After the inspection cruise (which was no closer than three kilometers to the nearest Habomai island) Miyazawa met with a group of local fishermen who presented him with a petition calling for the islands' return and safety from Soviet seizure of their fishing boats. On 12 September the Russians, in obvious retaliation for the inspection tour, seized three Japanese fishing vessels, impounded the boats, and charged the crews with espionage against the Soviet Union.

The Russians also charge that a double standard is being applied by the Japanese in their dealings with the Soviet Union. The professed Japanese foreign policy of seikei bunri (the separation of politics and economics) is applied, say the Soviets, to all countries except the USSR.<sup>84</sup> Although the Soviet Union is not the only country where Japan has modified its seikei bunri policy, Moscow argues that it is an anti-Soviet ultramilitaristic group in Japan that is using the Northern Territories issue to prevent good Japanese-Soviet relations by linking the dispute to economic, cultural, and diplomatic dealings.<sup>85</sup> The Soviets assert that this "double standard" has been especially detrimental to the conclusion of a peace treaty.

Despite Russian claims of being an Asian power based on geography, history, and superpower status, the USSR is still regarded by most Asians as being outsiders and highly



suspect. But the conclusion of a Japanese-Soviet peace treaty would lend increased legitimacy to Moscow's eastern activities. Ideally the Soviets want the peace treaty to legalize the territorial status quo in East Asia so as to dispense not only with the Northern Territories problem, but also to significantly weaken Chinese claims.<sup>86</sup> As a stop-gap measure, the Russians proposed in February 1978 (facing the increased prospects of a Sino-Japanese treaty) a "Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness." It was proposed when a draft of the Soviet offer was published in Izvestia. The Kremlin's unilateral publication of the draft treaty highly offended the Japanese officials, and it drew criticisms such as "discourteous" and "insulting" for two reasons: Moscow had not consulted with any Japanese officials prior to the draft's publication, and the treaty made no mention of the territorial issue.<sup>87</sup> The Japanese were further incensed by the revelation that certain clauses in the treaty were included in Soviet treaties it had with its "satellite" states in Eastern Europe. The proposed treaty was summarily rejected amid Japanese media accusations that the Soviets were trying to "Finlandize" Japan.

The Soviets have also utilized the practice of Japanese visiting their family graves on the southern Kuriles in attempting to influence Japanese political behavior. Since 1946 the Russians had allowed the annual visitation of ancestral graves only if family members could produce a valid

Japanese passport and obtain an entry visa from the Soviet embassy (no small task). In May 1964 a visiting Vice-Premier Mikoyan gave, as a "gift", to Japanese family members, the right to enter Shikotan and the Habomais for grave visitation purposes needing only an identification card issued by the Japanese government (the same requirement that was needed to enter U.S.-run Okinawa).<sup>88</sup> Japanese criticism of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 resulted in an immediate suspension of all grave visitations in the Northern Territories. Though the suspensions were temporary, they soon developed into a familiar pattern of retaliation by the Russians against "harmful" Japanese behavior. Visit suspensions were also enforced in 1971 and 1972. The 1971 event was a result of Prime Minister Sato's presentation of the territorial issue before the United Nations General Assembly; the 1972 suspension was a reaction to the opening of formal relations between Tokyo and Peking. On 3 September 1976 the Japanese embassy in Moscow was informed that identification cards alone would not be acceptable for visits to Shikotan or the Habomais; the Soviets decided again to require both Japanese passports and Soviet visas. The new terms, called "entirely unjustifiable" by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, were seen to be part of a more deliberate Soviet program to tighten their grip on the Northern Territories in light of Tokyo's refusal to give any support to Gromyko's peace treaty proposal or the Asian collective security plan and as a

demonstration of displeasure for the impending "inspection" of the islands by Foreign Minister Miyazawa.<sup>89</sup>

#### 4. Politics and Public Opinion

The Soviets argue that the alleged territorial issue has become a "stale" subject.<sup>90</sup> They contend, however, that Japan has real and definite reasons for continuing the charade in the southern Kuriles. The motive is to present the Russians as a threat to Japanese security; in this manner anti-Soviet propaganda can be whipped-up to substantiate tremendous boosts in military spending by the "ultra-nationalist" rulers of Japan.<sup>91</sup> Japan will then (with U.S. approval) become a strong regional power, threatening the security of the rest of Asia, ruining its economy, and finally resulting in the same disaster it experienced in the Pacific War.

The Russians also present many of their Japanese language Radio Moscow broadcasts concerning the "so-called territorial issue" with the Japanese public in mind. They emphasize that the territorial issue has been settled for a long time, that the Japanese public understands this and accepts the Soviet position, and that it is only the unrealistic, militaristic nature of the pro-U.S. Japanese officials that are using the Northern Territories dispute for their own political advantage.<sup>92</sup> The Russians contend that the Japanese public has long given up any territorial claims over the southern Kuriles and that the Japanese government and the LDP

are using the problem to attract more "disoriented" people to their fold.<sup>93</sup> The Soviets emphasize that the people of Hokkaido would be positively effected by greater trade with the Soviet Union if only the government would cease its groundless demands for the return of the islands that the Hokkaido residents realize will never be returned to Japan.<sup>94</sup> The preoccupation of Japanese officials with the Northern Territories, the Russians say, has caused them to neglect the real needs and problems of the people.

The Soviets assert that the presentation of the Northern Territories in the nation-wide school curriculum, designation of a "Northern Territories Day", and "inspections" of the islands by government officials all comprise an intentional government program to destroy the possibility of close Japanese-Soviet relations. In fact, they say that the Northern Territories Day should more correctly be called Anti-Soviet Day.<sup>95</sup> The Northern Territories campaigns have also been called an "open encroachment on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Soviet Union."<sup>96</sup>

The Russians have also taken to using the ploy of inviting various Japanese politicians to the Soviet Union to discuss particular problems between the two countries. They use the forum to reiterate their belief that no territorial problem exists, wine and dine the politicians, and then send them home with the hope that their "revelation of realizations" will sift back and influence the Japanese.

Hokkaido's 5.5 million Japanese have been the special target of a Russian campaign to weaken that population's support for the return of the Northern Territories.<sup>97</sup> The campaign has two purposes - persuade the Hokkaido Japanese that the Northern Territories will never be returned, and destroy the "myth" of a Soviet threat to Japan. The Russians figure that if the Hokkaido residents can be convinced that the disputed territories are gone forever and the Soviets present no threat to them, Tokyo will lose much of the power of its assertion that the Japanese people, and not the government, demand the return of the southern Kuriles. The campaign's specific efforts have taken, according to a DIA report, the following form:

(1) A number of Soviet-Japanese "friendship halls" have been erected in Hokkaido. Their construction and activities are being supported, in large measure, by the contributions of Japanese businesses, especially fishing, that have a stake in cultivating the good will of the Russians.

(2) Several Japanese-Soviet associations have become active in Hokkaido. These are staffed and controlled by pro-Soviet Japanese and actively supported by Japanese businessmen who have an interest in trade with the Russians.

(3) Some fishing communities, with the assistance of the friendship halls, have taken steps to distance themselves from the Northern Territories campaigns and demonstrations. Their non-support for the government-sponsored efforts are

intended to ingratiate themselves with the Soviets and hopefully obtain favorable fishing conditions.

The Soviets have used every opportunity and means available to try to convince the Japanese that the territorial matter is settled and that continued revanchist claims have the singular effect of damaging Japanese-Soviet relations. And in any case, say the Soviets, Japan is helpless to change the current situation.

D. TARGET: THE JAPANESE-CHINESE-AMERICAN ENTENTE

Without question the two priority goals of Soviet policy in Asia have been to reduce American power and influence in the region and to contain the People's Republic of China. Japan's role for Soviet accomplishment of these objectives has, until the last ten years, been almost totally neglected. But since the normalization of relations between the PRC, the United States, and Japan, the Soviet Union has witnessed a disturbing tide of economic, political, and military cooperation that appears to the Kremlin as a growing anti-Soviet security alliance. The territorial problem has been used intermittently by the Soviets in an attempt to influence the formation and strength of such an alliance.

1. Brezhnev's Collective Security Scheme

Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev first enunciated his collective security plan for Asia in 1969. Over the next ten years the vague and amorphous scheme has been revised and

restated until it has evolved into six basic precepts:

(1) peaceful neighborly relations should prevail among sovereign, independent nations as a solution to all problems, (2) use of force in any situation among states is unjustifiable, (3) states should conduct their own internal affairs without any outside interference, (4) imperialism, in all forms, must disappear from Asia, (5) current geographical boundaries should be observed by all nations, and (6) current regional alliances should be dissolved.<sup>98</sup>

The plan is intended to be a nonmilitary association of states observing the above principles. Reaction to the proposal has been almost entirely negative, and it has been interpreted by most Asian nations as a carefully conceived Soviet plan to isolate the PRC, to prevent a response by the Asian states to Soviet military power, and to obliterate Japanese and Chinese territorial claims against the USSR. The biggest problem the Soviets have had in selling the idea has been the severe credibility gap that has evolved as a result of its policies in Africa, Cuba, Indochina, Afghanistan, and Eastern Europe.

## 2. The Japanese-Chinese-American Entente

Moscow asserts that since the establishment of relations among the three powers (1972), there has been a steadily growing military alliance that is directed against the USSR. In the September 1978 edition of Red Star, the Russian military newspaper, the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty

of 1978 was called "a step towards a joint military bloc of the U.S., China, and Japan."<sup>99</sup> Pravda (8 February 1981) called the Japanese acceptance of joining the PRC and the U.S. in a de facto alliance as a decision which "elevates anti-Sovietism to the rank of state policy."<sup>100</sup> Washington and Peking's encouragement for increased Japanese defense expenditures, alternating visits of Chinese and Japanese military contingents to each others' countries, and the U.S. government's decision to sell weaponry to the Chinese all appear to the Soviets (with good cause) as actions aimed directly at the Soviet Union. In a January 1978 speech, the then Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda did not quell Soviet fears when he stated:

Japan's close cooperation with the United States is the basic pivot of Japanese foreign policy. In this context, the Japan-China peace treaty is not to be regarded as a simple bilateral agreement, but rather as a more advanced form of cooperation with the US. That is, we consider the treaty as one facet of the US world strategy.<sup>101</sup>

The Russians have retorted to anyone who will listen that continued anti-Soviet activity by the three powers will threaten the security of Asia and have the direst of consequences.<sup>102</sup> As will be seen, the Northern Territories have become political carrots used by the Kremlin leaders to influence Japanese behavior in this quadrilateral relationship, hostages to "correct" Japanese behavior.



### 3. Japan and the People's Republic of China

Because the People's Republic of China is the major Soviet preoccupation in Asia, Japan's relationship to the Soviet Union has to be interpreted by the Russians, to a large extent, by the political distance maintained between the Japanese and Chinese. As Japan and China move closer into more cooperative efforts (which has been the case since 1972), so have Soviet endeavors increased to stop what it sees as an alliance based on anti-Sovietism. However, Japan, with its "swing" status between the two great powers, is feared less by the Russians for its possible contributions to a military alliance than what the Japanese could do economically and technologically to help the Chinese achieve their desire for modernization.

The Northern Territories problem has been a primary vehicle used by Moscow in an attempt to prevent closer Sino-Japanese ties. As Japanese rapprochement with China became a reality in 1972, the Soviets had to readjust their policy toward Japan. A January 1972 Gromyko mission to Tokyo failed to prevent the joint recognition of China and Japan and failed to make any headway in convincing the Japanese to accept the terms of a peace treaty proposal. The Russians suggested a summit meeting in Moscow between Brezhnev and the new Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka to discuss overall relations. The two-day conference took place in October 1973 with the Russians pushing for Japanese participation in their

collective security plan; in turn, the territorial issue seemed to be open for negotiation. One official of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union stated during the conference, "Asian security should come first. The territorial question is a minor question that can be settled if a peaceful co-existence structure in Asia is firmly established."<sup>103</sup> After the conference, other Soviet officials dropped other conspicuous hints that the Northern Territories problem was negotiable. A Japanese Communist Party delegate to Moscow later in 1973 gained agreement with his Soviet counterparts that a peace treaty should be signed with the Habomais and Shikotan returned immediately to Japan and the status of the two larger islands left for future settlement.<sup>104</sup>

The Soviets could live with Sino-Japanese cross-recognition, but as further cooperation, economic treaties, and diplomatic warmth increased, Moscow's position in the Northern Territories hardened considerably. Despite half-hearted efforts by the Japanese to instigate peace treaty discussions, after the 1973 summit conference the Russians expressed little interest in renewing negotiations. From 1972 to 1976 no senior Soviet official visited Japan (no top-ranking Soviet leader, including Brezhnev and Kosygin, has ever visited Japan).<sup>105</sup> Even though the Russians have indicated that the territorial issue was settled and would never be discussed, the situation was soon to change.

At the time that Japan and the PRC established diplomatic relations in 1972, the Chinese leaders still regarded the two nations as being in a legal state of war, even though Japan and the Nationalist Chinese concluded a peace treaty in 1952. Chinese and Japanese leaders had both expressed a desire during the formal talks to establish diplomatic relations to proceed to negotiate a "treaty of peace and friendship." As deliberations for such a treaty began in 1974, the Chinese insisted on the inclusion of a clause stating that the countries were opposed to other countries seeking "hegemony" in Asia. The Japanese were reluctant to include the anti-hegemony clause because of its obvious reference to the Soviet Union and Tokyo's desire not to anger the Russians; when negotiations bogged down over acceptance of the clause, the disagreement became public. The Russians held up the anti-hegemony clause as evidence of Peking's design to make Asia a Chinese playground. Japan was thus directly involved in the Sino-Soviet rivalry.

Moscow's reluctance to discuss the Northern Territories after the 1973 summit conference caused Japan, in late 1975, to reconsider its opposition to the anti-hegemony clause. This quickly brought Foreign Minister Gromyko to Tokyo in January 1976 with an offer to exchange the two smaller islands for a solid promise that Japan would not sign a treaty with the Chinese that contained an anti-hegemony clause.<sup>106</sup> The Japanese reacted with indignation over what

they declared was a Sino-Japanese bilateral matter. They refused the offer and announced that treaty negotiations with the Chinese would proceed. On 13 January 1976, Prime Minister Miki declared that there would not be a peace treaty between Japan and the USSR until all of the Northern Territories had been returned to Japan.<sup>107</sup>

For two long years Sino-Japanese treaty talks dragged on. Then on 10 January 1978 Soviet Premier Kosygin told visiting Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda that "the Soviet Union does not recognize the existence of a territorial problem in its relations with Japan."<sup>108</sup> Sonoda refused to sign the joint communique of the meeting and rebuffed a new peace treaty proposal by Gromyko because it made no mention of the territorial issue. When Sonoda returned to Japan, the Japanese government accused Moscow of "unilaterally negating" the 1973 summit conference groundwork that (from the Japanese viewpoint) laid basis to Japanese territorial claims.<sup>109</sup>

As it became apparent that a Sino-Japanese treaty would be signed in 1978, the Soviet began to apply pressure in their own inimitable way to prevent its conclusion. The Soviets threatened to "revise" their relations with the Japanese if a treaty was signed and indicated that an anti-Soviet treaty would necessitate that the USSR take "defensive countermeasures" against Japan.<sup>110</sup> The ultimate intimidation came in May and June when the Russians held extensive military maneuvers in the Northern Territories; ground troops

were stationed on the islands of Kunashir and Iturup, the first since 1960. Live-fire amphibious exercises occurred in July off the two large islands, and increased Soviet naval traffic appeared in all three of the strategic straits leaving the Sea of Japan. Soviet military officials, for their part, steadfastly maintained that the military forces on the islands were there to protect against a Chinese attack and are not in any manner directed against Japan.<sup>111</sup>

The rhetorical and physical intimidation was counter-productive. A Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty (PFT) was signed on 12 August 1978 in Peking. The treaty declared that neither China nor Japan would seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and would oppose efforts by other countries to do so. Japanese insistence saw the inclusion of two clauses: (1) the agreement would not affect any existing relations with any third countries (protecting the U.S.-Japan security pact), and (2) in an effort to partially pacify the Soviets, the anti-hegemony clause was stated as not being directed against any particular country.<sup>112</sup>

Soviet intransigence on the territorial issue and undisguised military intimidation of Japan during the final stages of the PFT talks seemed to enhance what they were designed to prevent. By signing the treaty, promulgating extensive economic cooperation agreements, and increasing cultural, political, and military exchange programs with the Chinese, the Japanese have consciously modified their

professed "equidistance" policy between Moscow and Peking. The result, as evidenced by the territorial issue, has been an upward-spiraling circle of intimidation and the elimination of reason from Japanese-Soviet relations. Premier Kosygin called the PFT an "historic mistake."<sup>113</sup> The Soviet press has labeled it a "vicious anti-Soviet device" and a "dangerous factor for increasing the tension in Asia."<sup>114</sup> Since 1978 the Soviets have repeatedly demanded that the Japanese sign a treaty of good neighborliness and cooperation with them as a balance to the Chinese treaty and as proof of Japan's intentions to maintain good Japanese-Soviet relations."<sup>115</sup> The Japanese have refused, denying that they have anything to make amends for and point out that Soviet refusal to even discuss the territorial issue is the real impediment to such a pact.

Moscow has also cited Tokyo's double standard in dealing with the territorial issues involving the Soviet Union and China.<sup>116</sup> Both China and Japan claim the Senkaku Islands, a tiny group of islets lying north of Taiwan and south of the Ryukyus. In 1972 after formal diplomatic relations were established, both Peking and Tokyo agreed to shelve the territorial dispute and hold it for future discussions. Again in 1978, when the PFT was concluded, the dispute was conveniently avoided by both parties and agreement was made to resolve the issue at some unspecified date. The Soviets maintain that that is the same formula that they have always proposed for

settling the Northern Territories problem and the consummation of a peace treaty. Moscow has thus pointed to this double standard in dealing with territorial issues as further evidence of Tokyo's tilted policy toward China.

The PRC, of course, has its own territorial claims against the Soviet Union, which is another incentive for the Russians to gain Japanese acquiescence to the status quo. If Moscow can cause the Japanese to abandon their claims to the Northern Territories, China will be the only country in Asia with revanchist claims against the USSR, thereby reducing the strength of the Chinese position. Because of the Chinese claims and the border clashes of 1969, many of the harsh statements from Moscow denying Japanese territorial appeals have been intended for Chinese as well as Japanese ears.

#### 4. Japan and the United States

Although the primary focus of Moscow's relations with Japan has been the containment of China, the Soviets have also aimed toward reducing the American influence and presence in Asia. Brezhnev's collective security scheme was an attempt, in part, to reduce U.S. influence with the Japanese as the plan called for the end of all current security relationships and treaties. The territorial issue has been used as a fulcrum for attempting to pry Japan away from the Americans. The Russian media, not surprisingly, has maintained that the territorial issue was invented in Washington by former

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and owes its genesis to the Cold War.<sup>117</sup> Now, say the Russians, the Chinese have become the American proxies in pushing the Japanese to press for territorial concessions.<sup>118</sup>

Moscow's reason for reneging on their promise in the 1956 Joint Peace Declaration (to return Shikotan and the Habomais immediately upon consummation of a peace treaty) is that the situation in Asia has changed considerably over the years. Their interpretation is that East Asia is significantly more anti-Soviet (thanks to Chinese and American influence) than it was in 1956.<sup>119</sup> It is to be noted that the Soviets first revised the conditions for the reversion of Shikotan and the Habomais on 27 January 1960, only days after the Japanese government approved a revised security treaty with the United States. Foreign Minister Gromyko announced then that the entire Northern Territories would be retained by the USSR until all foreign (American) military forces had completely withdrawn from Japan.<sup>120</sup> Gromyko's declaration was interpreted in Japan as a blatant Soviet attempt to destroy U.S.-Japanese security relations and ensure Japan's neutralization.

In September 1964, Premier Krushchev told a visiting delegation of LDP members that the existence of U.S. military bases and troops in Japan was the sole reason for the delay in the return of the "territories claimed by Japan."<sup>121</sup> The Japanese countered that American troops were in Japan prior to the 1956 Joint Peace Declaration and no mention of their removal was ever made.



Moscow states that as a tool used by the United States during the Cold War and continuing to the present, the Northern Territories issue is hurting Japanese-Soviet relations. In order to restore good relations, the Russians argue that the Cold War legacy should be jettisoned as an anachronistic disservice to the Japanese people.<sup>122</sup> The only way to do that is to drop the issue. And even if the USSR returned all of the islands, the result, the Soviets contend, would be the stationing of U.S. forces on the islands, causing regional instability and threats to the peace of Japan.<sup>123</sup>

#### E. THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES

Beginning in the mid-1970's there has been a steady and substantial buildup in the Soviet military presence in the Northern Territories. Troop levels have increased, equipment has been upgraded, and overall force capabilities have likewise grown. Having achieved many of their force-level goals in Europe, the Soviets have begun to pay more attention to building a power base in East Asia. The military activities in and around the Northern Territories is an example of that expanding attention.

##### 1. Chronology

After the conclusion of World War II, a Soviet corps of ground troops (one motorized division and one brigade) and a handful of MIG-17 fighters were stationed on Iturup and Kunashir. Krushchev's decision to reduce the Soviet armed forces by 1.2 million men in 1960 was the reason that the

ground troops were withdrawn during the summer of that year.<sup>124</sup> No additional military forces were deployed to the Northern Territories from 1960 to 1978.

Significant Soviet naval activity picked-up in April 1975 with the Okean II exercises, part of which involved four naval task forces deployed around the Japanese home islands. In July of 1976 Soviet warships, in a demonstrative show of force, sailed from the Sea of Japan through the Tsushima Strait past Okinawa while Russian reconnaissance aircraft flew southwards along both the east and west coasts of Japan.

As the prospects of Japan and the PRC signing a peace treaty were increased in mid-1978, the Soviets acted with dispatch. Not since the 1960 redeployment had Soviet ground forces been stationed in the Northern Territories. During May and June of 1978 combined air, ground, and naval forces took part in maneuvers around Iturup and Kunashir.<sup>125</sup> A Soviet task force of two Kresta-2 class guided-missile cruisers accompanied by two destroyers moved from the Guam area to Kurile waters to take part in the amphibious portion of the exercises. There they rendezvoused with twelve Antanov-12 troop transports and an unknown number of submarines and support ships. Subsequently, Russian marines from Vladivostok and part of the crack 6th Airborne Division from Khabarovsk conducted combined amphibious/airborne live-fire exercises on the two large islands. The exercises began on the same day (14 June 1978) that it was announced that China and Japan had

agreed to reopen the final stages of the PFT talks. When the dust had settled, 2,000 ground troops remained on the islands and new construction was soon begun to house the garrisoned soldiers. In July 1978 additional amphibious and live-fire exercises were staged in the waters around Iturup.<sup>126</sup> Soon after the formal signing of the Sino-Japanese PFT on 12 August 1978 the troop levels on Kunashir and Iturup had grown to 4,000.

In January 1979 the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) announced that the level of Soviet forces in the Northern Territories had risen to 5,000 and that extensive work on airfield runways, port facilities, radar stations, and other military construction was in full progress.<sup>127</sup> Official protests were lodged by the Japanese embassy in Moscow; they were rejected by the Russians as interference in internal Soviet affairs.<sup>128</sup> Other development in 1979 saw SS-20 missiles deployed near Khabarovsk; aerial photographs showed even more extensive construction on runways, barracks, and port facilities in the Northern Territories than had been previously reported by the JDA. And the arrival of two new ships the Minsk and the Ivan Rogov, substantially increased the capabilities of the Soviet Pacific Fleet.

In May 1979 the Soviets opened the harbor at Shakotan Bay on Shikotan and stationed a brigade-size force of ground troops on the island, the first Soviet soldiers ever garrisoned on Shikotan.<sup>129</sup> On 26 September 1979 the JDA announced that

the Soviet troop level throughout the Northern Territories had increased to 10,000, with an army division headquarters on Iturup.<sup>130</sup> It was also announced that the discovery of the Soviet deployments on Shikotan and the calculations of Soviet forces had been obtained from United States intelligence sources.<sup>131</sup> In December 1980 the JDA revealed that two new airfields were under construction by the Soviets in Iturup.<sup>132</sup> Protests and counter-protests, petitions and refusals to accept them have stone-walled any discussion between the two governments about the current situation.

## 2. Intentions and Motivations

While slightly facilitating the air and ground missions of the Soviet armed forces in the Far East, the overwhelming military value of the Northern Territories is in the benefits they bring to the Soviet Navy. Soviet Naval Commander-in-Chief Sergei Gorshkov's strategy vis-a-vis Japan during a conflict is to sever it from North America and Western Europe and ultimately (if necessary) threaten its very survival.<sup>133</sup> The Gorshkov conventional navy is cited as being forward-deployed, anti-carrier, anti-strategic submarine, and performing a valuable diplomatic and political role.<sup>134</sup> The possession of the Northern Territories greatly enhances the execution of these goals. Admiral Gorshkov's insistence on an ever-expanding ring of air and naval bases further dictates that functional roles are allocated to the southern Kuriles.<sup>135</sup> The six naval functions of the Northern

Territories are: (1) serve as an ice-free, full-fledged naval base, (2) extend the anti-submarine, anti-carrier aircraft platforms for increased coverage, (3) serve to insure free access to and from the open ocean, (4) operate as logistical replenishment stations for the rest of the region, (5) enhance the potential for interdicting sea lines of communication between Japan and the outside world, and (6) hamper U.S. naval operations in the area.

There also appears to be a conscious effort by the Russian navy to relocate some of its forces from Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces to Sakhalin, Petropavlovsk, and other bases rimming the Sea of Okhotsk.<sup>136</sup> Building-up of the Korsakov naval base on Sakhalin would seem to be a viable alternative. Vladivostok, the present Pacific Fleet headquarters, is not only vulnerable to Chinese attack, but it is nearly completely surrounded by non-Soviet territory. A base at Korsakov, only eighty miles from Hokkaido, together with Soviet possession of the Northern Territories, allows the Soviet Navy to completely avoid the three chokepoints at Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima. Should Korsakov become the new center of Soviet naval activity in the Far East, the Kurile chain would become more important as a necessary shield.

Tactically, the Northern Territories are, as previously stated, excellent for projecting military operations against Hokkaido. Amphibious, airborne, heliborne, and motorized forces can all be deployed from the Northern Territories.

Admittedly, the capability to mount such an offensive is modest at present, but the introduction into the Pacific Fleet of the VTOL aircraft carrier Minsk and the modern amphibious ship Ivan Rogov considerably increases the capabilities of the Soviets to conduct such an exercise. These and other types of offensive military equipment into the region gives Japanese defense officials pause to wonder about their ultimate use.<sup>137</sup>

Clearly one of the primary motivations for the military buildup in the Northern Territories is to bring political pressure to bear on the Japanese. The Japanese fully realize the Russian navy's ability to threaten the maritime lifeblood of Japan. The Northern Territories forces serve as a not-so-subtle reminder of this vulnerability and the overwhelming power the Soviets could, if needed, apply. Frequent artillery and missile firing practices, numerous violations of Japanese airspace, and the arbitrary clearing of Japanese fishermen from waters designated for military maneuvers all serve as heavy-handed attempts to reinforce Japanese insular vulnerabilities.

Levels and activities of the Russian military forces have varied with the political distances between the countries in the region. As has been noted, close Sino-Japanese relations have seen the buildup in the Soviet Kurile forces, while problems between Japan and her two big friends in the region, the U.S. and the PRC, have witnessed a more moderate stance by the Russians in arming the islands.

### 3. Current Forces

The only comments coming out of Moscow concerning the deployment of military forces in the Northern Territories has been a determination to portray the deployments as an "internal affair" directed against a potential Chinese attack, although how that might involve the Northern Territories is unspecified. A Soviet general has been quoted by Kyodo News Service as acknowledging the presence of "several battalions" on the islands.<sup>138</sup>

Military force levels in the Northern Territories are estimated at approximately 10,000 - which includes ground forces, air crews, naval support, and logistical personnel.<sup>139</sup> Surrounding Japan in the Northeast Asia region there are fifteen Soviet divisions in the Maritime Provinces, two divisions on Sakhalin, one division in Kamchatka, some 75,000 KGB border guards, as well as the Soviet Pacific Fleet and over 2,000 military aircraft.<sup>140</sup>

### 4. Ground Forces

Ground forces in the Northern Territories consist of a motorized rifle division, approximately 6,000 men, with its divisional headquarters located at Tenni on Iturup.<sup>141</sup> The divisional headquarters is known to have direct connections with the Far East regional army headquarters at Khabarovsk. Their equipment consists of the following:<sup>142</sup>

approximately 50 tanks (T62, T64 vintage)  
12 Mi24 assault helicopters (w/anti-tank missiles)  
130mm artillery (usually found at corps level)  
BM-21 multiple rocket launchers  
ZSU-23-4 anti-aircraft guns  
"Gainful" surface-to-air missiles  
BMP, BTR-50P armored personnel carriers

Their small arms are believed to be of the latest Soviet manufacture. Although in garrison configuration, the ground forces possess the capability to mount amphibious, motorized, or vertical lift assaults on limited objectives for limited periods of time, providing its own air defense and own fire support. Some 2,000 to 5,000 KGB border guards, with 10 patrol boats, are also stationed in the Northern Territories.<sup>143</sup>

#### 5. Naval Activities

The Northern Territories provide the Soviet Pacific Fleet with nine fully operational anchorages/harbors. Because the Pacific Fleet has been reinforced and upgraded more than any other service in the Far East, this must certainly be a welcome asset for the Russians. As Soviet naval power grows in rimming the Sea of Okhotsk, the Kurile bases become even more valuable. Soviet naval forces conduct numerous practice missile firings in the Northern Territories' waters, both for tactical and strategic ballistic purposes.

#### 6. Air Forces

Three sizeable airfields are known to exist in the Northern Territories - one on Iturup at Tenni (3,000 meters long) and two on Kunashir at Tofutsu (2,600 meters) and Furukamappu (2,000 meters). The field at Tenni is capable of



handling any aircraft in the Soviet inventory. Reports from the JDA have stated that two additional runways are under construction on Iturup. Approximately twenty-four MIG-17's are scattered among these fields; they are scheduled to be replaced with MIG-23's and SU-19's.<sup>144</sup> The most likely use for the fighters would seem to be for air defense and close air support of ground troops.

#### 7. Reactions

Japanese official reaction, while privately worried, was originally to declare that the Soviet troops posed no real threat to Japan.<sup>145</sup> This line soon changed. With the Russian naval visits to Cam Rahn Bay in Vietnam, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the reinforcement of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, attitudes concerning the military developments changed. The deployment of the Ivan Rogov to the Far East shattered, for many, the concept of "no threat." The recognition of the Ivan Rogov as an offensive ship, Soviet practice amphibious assaults in Iturup (which JDA officials have noted closely corresponds to the topography of Japan's west coast), and numerous missile and artillery firings that endanger Japanese fishermen were incidents that led to the labeling of Soviet forces in the southern Kuriles as "extremely provocative," an "illegal occupation," and "extremely regretable."<sup>146</sup> While most Japanese do not believe that the Soviet Union intends to invade Japan, they do seem to recognize the merits of a vigilant monitoring of the situation. The JDA has recognized

the reduced warning time that Japan would have in the event of a Soviet attack. A retired Self Defense Force general estimated that Soviet invasion forces deployed from the Maritime Provinces would give Japan five to seven days of warning time to prepare as compared to two days if the forces were deployed from the Northern Territories.<sup>147</sup>

The Chinese reaction has been to warn the Japanese that they are becoming an increasingly likely target for Soviet hegemonism.<sup>148</sup> They have taken the opportunity to urge increased Japanese defense expenditures. The United States has been relatively quiet about the buildup but has steadily passed intelligence data to the Japanese concerning the Soviet deployments in anticipation that it will increase the willingness of the Japanese to spend more in their defense.

## VI. THE JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE

The Japanese perspective of the Northern Territories is shaped by three factors - the historical distrust of the Russians, the demands of politics in a free society, and an emotional attachment (real or contrived) to some 5,000 square kilometers of volcanic protrusions. Relative to the Soviet viewpoint, the Japanese outlook centers not so much on the security of Japan as it does on the very essence and character of the nation of Japan.

### A. THE JAPANESE CONCEPT OF THEIR TERRITORY

The Japanese concept of territory differs considerably from that of the Russians. It is based less on historical and pragmatic considerations and more on the cultural and racial distinctiveness of the Japanese. A significant barrier to the solution of the Northern Territories dispute will be the ability of either side to philosophically accept a formula or agreement that runs counter to what they have professed to be in their national interest.

#### 1. The Japanese Concept

According to ancient Japanese mythology, reinforced neatly by the religion of Shinto, the Japanese Islands were created by the gods.<sup>149</sup> Though the aboriginal Ainu had to be driven out of the islands, there was no doubt as to the belief that the islands of Japan were divine gifts to the chosen

people. The demise of the thirteenth century Mongol invasions by fortuitous circumstances strengthened the Japanese belief that their land was blessed with a "divine uniqueness." The isolation of Japan from the Asian continent and the relative homogeneity of its people have reinforced that view. Professor Kimura Hiroshi of Hokkaido University states it this way:

Because of Japan's natural sea borders, the Japanese people have come to take it for granted that the natural, racial, linguistic, and cultural boundaries must coincide with political and administrative borders ... the Japanese view that each nation has its own inherent or inalienable territories, the land that is regarded historically and legally as part of a particular country alone.<sup>150</sup>

## 2. The Northern Territories as Inherent Japanese Lands

It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which the Japanese today regard the Northern Territories as inherent Japanese territory, but a reasonable survey of the literature written by Japanese on the subject would give the impression that the "inherent lands" theory retains strong adherence in the general population. The campaign for the reversion of Okinawa, as well as public opinion polls on the subject, also give strong indicators that the people of Japan feel as though the southern Kuriles are without doubt Japanese.

Despite the legalistic arguments of treaties and war-time agreements, Tokyo contends that the waters around the southern Kuriles have always been traditional Japanese fishing grounds and that the only people to live in the Northern Territories (disregarding, of course, the Ainu) for any appreciable time have been Japanese, as evidenced by the 1945

eviction of 16,000 Japanese Northern Territories settlers. Officials in Tokyo and many in the general public express bewilderment that the Russians cannot accept the assertion that the Northern Territories are inviolably Japanese.<sup>151</sup>

The Japanese position has been to distinguish between two clearly different phenomenon - their defeat in World War II and the retention of the right to negotiate changes in territorial possessions.<sup>152</sup> Although defeated, Japan, in accepting the Potsdam Proclamation, was allowed to retain "minor islands" to be determined by the Allies and thus any loss of sovereignty over Japan's Northern Territories would require the participation of Japan and the Soviet Union in territorial negotiations.

Some Japanese see the return of the southern Kuriles as a symbolic or psychological objective of Japanese diplomacy. The return of the "inviolable" Japanese islands would signal, for many, the final end to the Pacific War.<sup>153</sup> Former Prime Minister Sato once said "... the post-war period will not end until the Northern Territories have been returned."<sup>154</sup> The mayor of Nemuro, the Hokkaido city directly across from the Habomais, has said, "The simple fact is that the northern islands issue has carried over from World War II, and the war is not yet over in Nemuro."<sup>155</sup> The return of the islands would remove "the last reminder of defeat in a disgraceful war."<sup>156</sup>

### 3. Amae

Peripheral to the concept of inherent Japanese territory is a psychological trait of the Japanese that may, in some way, explain why they so tenaciously press the Northern Territories issue despite the fact that they face a nation of vast military power who historically has been difficult to obtain concessions from when in a position of strength.

The psychological trait is called amae, the noun form of the verb amaeru, and it means roughly "to look to others for affection." It is difficult for most non-Japanese to understand, and Frank Gibney's Japan: The Fragile Superpower is recommended for its excellent attempt to define what can be a terribly confusing abstraction.<sup>157</sup> In personal relationships amae means one person's passive reliance on another who is in a position of seniority or superiority. A Japanese child accepts the authority of his parents, but also expects their indulgence in caring for him.

Amae, though most prevalent in interpersonal relationships, can appear on a group scale. The demuring behavior of the Japanese people during the U.S. occupation was, in part, a function of the amae syndrome at work - acceptance of the authority of the occupiers (superior position), yet expecting the indulgence ascribed to the vanquished (inferior position).

The point here is not to draw a parallel between the personal and societal actions of the Japanese, but to point out that amae may, in some manner, help explain the reason

Japanese express incredulousness at the Soviet position of not granting any concessions in the Northern Territories when they command such a dominant position in the dispute. Former Prime Minister Fukuda told a Soviet official, "Why is your country concerned about such tiny islands? The territories which we have been requesting from your country occupy only a minor, insignificant portion of such a huge, vast country as yours."<sup>158</sup> A Japanese commentator for NHK Television Network in Japan asked the Soviet ambassador to Japan, "As I said earlier, the Soviet Union is a big power, and I want to ask you again if the Soviet Union cannot show magnanimity in dealing with us and come to the negotiating table?"<sup>159</sup> And in his closing remarks the commentator said to his audience:

As you might have noticed, Ambassador Polyansky gave the strong impression that he stood on firm principles and would never budge from them, not even an inch. I felt that his conviction seems to be incomprehensible to us if we try to perceive it according to our own way of thinking. It was incomprehensible if measured by the Japanese yardstick.<sup>160</sup>

#### B. AN INDEPENDENT JAPAN

Postwar Japanese foreign policy has been based on four elements: dependence on the United States for its physical protection; an "omnidirectional" approach for striving for good relations with all countries, as well as maintaining political "equidistance" between China and the Soviet Union; use of economic interdependence among nations as a tool for world stability; and the policy of seikei bunri (separation

of politics and economics) to avoid linkages. This foreign policy reflects Japan's dependence on the external world and its relatively weak defense structure. Two major criticisms are leveled at the conduct of Japanese foreign affairs; the criticisms, from both external and internal sources, are that Japanese diplomacy is based on a near-total dependence on the United States and that it is a product of an unprincipled, economically-motivated entity that makes opportunistic shifts in its policy to increase its economic wealth without assuming political liabilities.

The Japanese leadership is sensitive to these criticisms. They readily admit their dependence on the physical protection provided by the United States but reject the assertions that their foreign policy is only a reflection of economic imperialism and opportunism. The Northern Territories have provided the Japanese leadership with an issue that can be used to counter these accusations.

1. Seikei Bunri and the Equidistance Policies Abandoned

Japanese-Soviet relations are conspicuous because of the deliberate abandonment of the seikei-bunri policy. The Japanese have conspicuously linked their reluctance to cooperate economically with the Soviets to other actions taken by the USSR. The historical distrust of the Soviets, "frustrations caused by Soviet inconsistency, annoyance, and secretiveness," the intimidating nature of Soviet military power, and the Northern Territories dispute have caused this aberration in Japanese bilateral relations.<sup>161</sup>



Although the Soviets have attempted to make "mutual economic benefit" the basis for Japanese-Soviet relations, the tremendous value that could accrue to both sides through increased trade has, so far, gone unrealized.<sup>162</sup> The Japanese need for raw materials, the proximity of Siberian riches, and the rising trade controversies between the Japan, the United States, and the European Community are seen by many observers as sufficient reasons for Japan to cultivate close economic ties with the Soviet Union. Pragmatic considerations (Russian shortage of foreign currency, labor, infrastructure, and attractive projects) have limited the optimistic estimates of trade opportunities. But the real stumbling block to increased joint economic effort is the Japanese abandonment of seikei bunri and the conscious effort to tie Soviet concessions in the Northern Territories to expanded economic cooperation.

The Northern Territories problem provided an excellent example of the reversal of the "equidistance" policy of the Japanese concerning the USSR and the PRC. The Japanese had attempted innumerable times since the end of World War II to bring the Soviets to the negotiating table to discuss the territorial issue. The Russians refused, while using the Northern Territories as a political carrot for influencing Japanese behavior and furthering their own purposes. Finally, a combination of Soviet intransigence on the territorial issue, the buildup of Soviet military power in the region, and

Russian intimidation of Japan during the Sino-Japanese PFT talks convinced Tokyo to accept the treaty with its modified anti-hegemony clause, thereby aligning itself (however slightly) with Peking; the "equidistance" policy had tilted.<sup>163</sup> Conversely, a Soviet concession on the Northern Territories would probably have convinced the Japanese of the value of their "omnidirectional" evenhandedness with all nations.<sup>164</sup> David Rees commented on the Northern Territories issue:

... there is every reason to suppose that the continuing dispute will not only preclude a Japanese-Soviet peace treaty, but will directly help to cement Japan's recent ties with China, so as to translate Japanese resentment over the Northern Territories into a specifically anti-Soviet mode.<sup>165</sup>

## 2. Resistance to the Strong

Since the return of Okinawa in 1972, Japanese territorial claims have focused on the Northern Territories. In recent years, Tokyo has responded to Soviet intransigence on the issue with increased assertiveness. Much has been written in Japan about the Russian insensitivity to Japanese points of view and concerns; in commentaries concerning Japanese-Soviet relations the opinion is continually expressed that it is wrong to give in to the Russians, or any other opponent, just because they possess overwhelming power.<sup>166</sup>

Along with this assertiveness on the territorial issue, the Japanese have undertaken several activities to portray a more positive, independent Japan. In establishing its 200-mile off-shore economic zone in the 1977 Diet, Tokyo has persistently interpreted its zone as encompassing the southern Kurile waters.<sup>167</sup> Japanese Maritime Safety Agency vessels

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
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have entered the 200-mile zone just east of Sakhalin (which is claimed by the Soviets to be Russian waters) to give advice and aid to Japanese fishing boats, and the Soviets have not interfered. Despite de facto control by the Russians over the Northern Territories and their waters, Japanese fishing vessels, with full knowledge of Tokyo, enter southern Kurile waters and keep alive the claims of Japanese ownership. During fishing negotiations the Japanese have been extremely reluctant to accept Russian catch quotas, licenses, and on-board inspections so as not to cement the arguments of the Soviets that the Northern Territories and the adjacent waters belong to them.

The Japanese Diet passed a resolution in February 1979 proclaiming the Northern Territories to be Japanese land and urging the prime minister's office to demand the immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces on the islands.<sup>168</sup> When the Japanese ambassador in Moscow attempted to deliver the resolution to the Russian government, the Soviet deputy foreign minister refused to accept it, saying the issue "... may be of great concern for the Japanese, but it is not for the Russians."<sup>169</sup> The contempt of the Soviet government for a duly promulgated resolution from the Japanese government could not have helped but incensed Tokyo.

The Japanese are also turning-up the diplomatic heat concerning the Northern Territories, not with any wild dreams of Soviet capitulation, but for keeping the issue alive,

embarrassing the Russians, and demonstrating that, though weak in comparison to the Russians, it will not be broken into abandoning its territorial claims. Foreign Minister Ito brought the Northern Territories issue before the United Nations General Assembly in September 1980, the first time that has occurred since 1972.<sup>170</sup> The Kremlin was unfuried that the Japanese would take the matter before the General Assembly and responded by labeling the Japanese claim as "unrealistic and illegal demands."<sup>171</sup> A non-partisan Dietmen's mission took the Northern Territories roadshow to Europe in September 1981 with stops in Bonn, London, and Helsinki before visiting the UN in an effort to drum-up support for their position. The mission reported to the Diet that all of the officials contacted expressed sympathy and understanding for the Japanese position and that the U.S. permanent mission to the UN in New York "offered to play an active role in the UN General Assembly and other international bodies" in support of the Japanese position.<sup>172</sup> In October 1981 the mayor of Nemuro headed a mission of citizens from Hokkaido to the United States to seek assistance in achieving the reversion of the islands. The Japanese met with the chief of the State Department's Japan desk and the head of the Soviet desk, eliciting an assurance of U.S. support for their claims.<sup>173</sup> The Hokkaido group then proceeded to New York and the UN where they distributed pamphlets and maps concerning the territorial issue. The Japanese government continuously

protests the practice firings of Soviet weaponry in the waters of the southern Kuriles which endangers the lives of Japanese fishermen.<sup>174</sup> All of the missions, groups, and protests are not made in the expectation of actually obtaining Soviet concessions, but they do tweak the nose of the Russian bear and demonstrate that, though relatively weak, Japan will not be intimidated by the Soviets or compromised on the issue. In addition, the Japanese stance toward the USSR on the problem lends credibility in Peking and Washington (and with the people of Japan) to Tokyo's image as an independent diplomatic entity.<sup>175</sup>

The Japanese have attempted to make cosmetic changes to further substantiate their claims. In 1970 the Ministry of Education advised all of the nation's textbook publishers to insure that the Northern Territories were depicted in the same color as Japan proper and different from the Soviet Union.<sup>176</sup> In July 1980, April 1981, and again in October 1981 the Japanese Foreign Ministry advised its representatives in the forty-eight countries who were signatories of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty to seek their host government's cooperation in asking all cartographers in their countries to portray the Northern Territories as Japanese lands.<sup>177</sup> Other foreign map publishers have also been contacted. Some nations have responded, but not as many as had been hoped for. Another illustration of the Japanese insistence on the correct depiction of territorial ownership is that the term "middle line" is

used rather than "territorial waters" to delineate the extent of Soviet waters around the southern Kuriles.<sup>178</sup>

### 3. Principle

As previously stated, one of the criticisms of Japanese foreign policy has been that it is wishy-washy and swings with the political breezes. The territorial issue provides Japan with an example where they have taken a stand on principle. They can point to their unrelenting stance of yontoo ikkatsu (four islands in one bundle) before a Japanese-Soviet peace treaty is to be signed as a demonstration of consistency in foreign policy. The Japanese hope it may dispel some of the charges that Tokyo's conduct in foreign affairs is characterized by frequent opportunistic switches.<sup>179</sup> The unsuccessful attempt by the Soviets in 1978 to influence the Japanese in their treaty negotiations with the Chinese can be attributed, in part, to the conviction of the Japanese that their claims in the Northern Territories are just and that they could not be intimidated into abandoning it.

#### C. MAINTAINING DISTANCE FROM THE RUSSIAN BEAR

The historic distrust and dislike between Russians and Japanese is an assumption that cannot be overlooked without a closer examination from the Japanese perspective. From the first contacts in the seventeenth century to the present, the animosities have run deep. Can it be that the Northern Territories problem is not so much a desire by the Japanese to regain lost territory as it is a campaign to prevent the



development of inter-state affairs with a nation whose intentions and methods are highly suspect?

1. Historical Distrust and Dislike

The historic animosity between the Japanese and Russians has already been mentioned, but it is important to reiterate these emotive factors in evaluating the Japanese position in the Northern Territories. In 1862 the Japanese scholar Yukichi Fukuzawa wrote, "At any rate, I decided that Russia was a country in which we could not safely unburden our minds."<sup>180</sup> To a considerable degree, the sentiment expressed by Fukuzawa remains the same today. The Soviets are accused of activities that are "exactly the same as those of tsarist Russia."<sup>181</sup> Soviet involvement in Africa, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Poland have done little to dispel their negative image; military forces in the Northern Territories, violations of Japanese airspace, and the towing of a damaged nuclear submarine through Japanese waters are examples of the kind of actions that cause a mistrust of the Soviets. The Japanese Defense Agency contends that the Soviet Union and its military forces present the only plausible armed threat to Japan.<sup>182</sup> In an October 1980 nationwide poll conducted by the Tokyo Shimbun, 76.7% of the respondents identified the Soviet Union as a country that "may pose a military threat to Japan in the future."<sup>183</sup> North Korea was a distant second at 17.2%.

The Russians are also cited for their "high-handedness and contemptuous attitude" and the demeanor that the Soviets portray of being racially superior.<sup>184</sup> The Soviet unilateral promulgation of draft treaties, agreements, and proposals are indications to the Japanese that Moscow feels, because of its superior military power, it can do whatever it wants to in its relations with Tokyo. The Japanese are also aware of what they see as the Russians' "utter ignorance and insensitivity" on matters involving Japanese society.<sup>185</sup>

In regards to the Northern Territories, Tokyo points out that Japan has territorial disputes with the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, but at least these nations (unlike the Soviet Union) have been willing to discuss their differences. The Chinese in April 1978 tried to intimidate Japan in the Senkaku Islands by sending more than one hundred armed fishing boats to surround the islands, but the PRC, say the Japanese, soon learned that the use of threats and military pressures against Japan were counter-productive and stopped it.<sup>186</sup> The Japanese contend that the Russians have learned nothing from that example and have lost more than they could have hoped to have gained when the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty was signed. By clinging to the southern Kuriles and arming the islands, the USSR, Tokyo claims, is attempting "to turn the Sea of Okhotsk into its inland sea."<sup>187</sup>

## 2. The Northern Territories as a Shield

There are perhaps many varied and (to the Japanese) valid reasons for keeping the territorial issue alive in the face of Soviet immobility. Perhaps it is principle; perhaps it is an effort to get Soviet concessions in other areas such as fishing or Siberian resource development; perhaps it is a symbolic issue that involves the very psyche of the "Japanese mind"; perhaps it is a pragmatic tool to use in gaining acceptance in an anti-Soviet alliance managed by Washington and Peking; or perhaps it is a belief that the islands are, in fact, "inherent" Japanese territory. All of these motivations have some shred of merit. But they do not tell the full story. Japanese suspicions of Russian intentions are as strong as ever. Perhaps then it is that the Northern Territories issue is used by the Japanese to prevent the improvement of relations that would, from Tokyo's viewpoint, increase Japanese dependence on Russian trade and resources, making Japan an economic hostage, weakening Japanese-American ties, and "Finlandizing" Japan into a colony of Soviet imperialism.

The territorial question pervades all aspects of Japanese-Soviet relations. Recently (September 1981) a joint trade unionist meeting of Japanese and Soviet labor leaders broke-up over the territorial issue; even a visiting Soviet female cosmonaut, who was heading a non-political women's exchange group, found Tokyo officials harsh in their condemnation of the Soviet position in the Northern Territories.<sup>188</sup>

Quite naturally, the Soviets have accused the current Japanese leadership (with American and Chinese backing) of using the Northern Territories to prevent the "establishment of a necessary treaty foundation under Soviet-Japanese relations."<sup>189</sup> The Japanese, for their part, cannot and will not admit that it is mutual distrust and hatred that keeps the two countries apart; it is much more convenient to blame the poor relations on the stumbling block of the Northern Territories. Reinhard Drifte, a professor of Japanese foreign policy at Geneva's Graduate Institute of International Studies, has said, "If the Northern Territories problem did not exist, the Japanese would have to create it - they have a natural antipathy toward the Soviet Union."<sup>190</sup>

Japanese officials understand the Soviet point of view and their deep concern with national security; the Russian position in the Northern Territories and their determination to retain the islands are well comprehended in knowledgeable Japanese circles. And thus statements such as, "But in the 1990's, in order to achieve a true partnership with Japan, they must return the islands," only serve to demand what is, under the present circumstances, unattainable from the Russians.<sup>191</sup> If the Japanese are truly desirous of a friendly association with the USSR, why did Tokyo ignore Brezhnev's recent (September 1981) call for improved relations, and for what purpose (other than political mileage) did Prime Minister Suzuki conduct an "inspection" of the Northern

Territories? The answer seems to be that the Japanese have departed from their normal seikei bunri course, and because of historic distrust, linkage is the policy that Tokyo is determined to use with the USSR. In an address to the House of Councillors, Suzuki stated that Japan did not seek confrontation with the Soviet Union, but declared that his government would not adopt a "loose-principled" policy of separating politics from economics in dealing with the Russians.<sup>192</sup>

The Japanese have made it clear that they will not take the initiative in seeking an improvement in the relationship, and the Northern Territories dispute may be used as an instrument to guarantee that, within the foreseeable future, close relations will not come to pass.

#### D. JAPANESE POLITICS

A superficial look at the Japanese government and the political scene would give one the sensation of an impressive solidarity of Japan's political forces behind the reversion of the Northern Territories. Since World War II ten Diet resolutions calling for an "early resolution" to the territorial problem have been passed and forwarded to the Japanese government; the Diet has designated 7 February as an annual "Northern Territories Day"; multi-party missions have been sent to the Soviet Union, the United States, European countries, and the United Nations to solicit support for a resolution to the issue; the House of Representatives has a Special Committee on Okinawa and the Northern Territories; and rallies and

demonstrations calling for the return of the islands are attended by leaders of all the major Japanese political parties. Though impressive on the surface, the "united front" shows cracks under closer scrutiny, for the aim of the political parties is to gain and maintain political power, and the territorial issue is a tool for such ends.

#### 1. Political Parties and Their Positions

The differing positions of the political parties on the territorial issue present interesting illustrations of Japanese politics at work. All of them know that the issue has political weight with the electorate, and to renounce Japanese claims to the islands, however unrealistic those demands may be, would be political hara kiri. The nationalistic sentiment that the Northern Territories evoke is such that no group seeking a role in determining Japan's political future can afford to ignore it.

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is the current ruling party of Japan, and the Japanese view of the territorial issue (yontoo ikkatsu) that has previously been expressed is that of the LDP. Again, their position is that Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, and the Habomais are "inherent" Japanese territory which were not included in Japan's renunciation of the Kuriles in 1951. These four islands, say the LDP, must be returned to Japan prior to a Japanese-Soviet peace treaty, and the disposition of the remainder of the Kuriles should be settled by a bilateral conference.

The Komeito (Clean Government Party) and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) agree with the position of the LDP, but while the DSP proposes a bilateral conference (Japan and the USSR) to settle the status of the remainder of the Kuriles, the Komeito prefers a trilateral conference (including the United States) to decide whether the rest of the Kuriles should be placed under UN trusteeship or given outright to Japan.

The Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), the leading opposition party in the Diet, asserts that all of the Kuriles (which it says includes Iturup and Kunashir) are "inalienable" Japanese territory and criticizes the LDP for limiting Japanese claims to just the Northern Territories. They favor regaining the Habomais and Shikotan upon the conclusion of a peace treaty with the Russians. Subsequent to a peace treaty, the JSP would, through "good and positive action" (including a total reexamination of Japanese-U.S. relations), negotiate with the Soviets to regain the entire Kurile archipelago.<sup>193</sup>

The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) asserts that the answer to the problem lies in developing friendly relations with the Soviet Union. The JCP says that a peace treaty should be immediately signed and the Habomais and Shikotan returned. The remainder of the Kuriles should be returned to Japan since Japan had not acquired them by "violence and greed."

The party platforms from the LDP, Komeito, and the DSP are not surprising. But the Kremlin has been especially disturbed by the stances taken by the leftist parties, the JSP and the JCP. Although a small JCP splinter group calling itself the Voice of Japan has echoed the Soviet line, the leftist political movement in Japan is strongly in favor of the Northern Territories being returned to Japanese control. Soviet criticism of the JCP has been especially gruff, saying "certain parties which are usually called 'progressive' have allowed themselves to be drawn into an ultranationalist orgy."<sup>194</sup> The JCP has continuously sent "open letters" to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), only to be rebuffed as being "extremely detrimental to the international Communist and general democratic movement."<sup>195</sup>

The JSP has been particularly harsh in their evaluation of the presence of Russian military forces in the Northern Territories. The JSP party chairman, Ichio Asukata, stated,

The military installations, because of their proximity to Japan, have only a first-strike capability and almost no defense value. Thus, I see no serious effects on the Soviet military posture in the area if the bases are removed.<sup>196</sup>

Over three years ago Asukata proposed to the Soviets that Hokkaido and all of the Kuriles (to include the Northern Territories) be established as demilitarized zones; the proposal, rather expectedly, was rejected.<sup>197</sup>



## 2. Using the Northern Territories

All of the Japanese political parties, some government agencies, and many of the major labor and industrial organizations are adept at utilizing the Northern Territories issue for their own benefit. Their directions and techniques are varied, but they all share the goal of increasing their own political influence.

The current LDP government is a good example. Prime Minister Suzuki's apparently successful meeting with President Ronald Reagan (May 1981) went awry back in Japan over the wording of the joint communique and its implications for U.S.-Japanese relations; the debate resulted in the resignation of Foreign Minister Ito and the questioning of the strength of the Suzuki government. As many others before him have discovered, Suzuki found that when things are going rough at home, it is frequently helpful to focus on threats from abroad. On 21 July the LDP announced the initiation of a month-long campaign across Japan to enhance public awareness of the Northern Territories dispute. Suzuki himself made an "inspection" of part of the Habomais from a helicopter on 10 September and met with Hokkaido residents to hear their views on the problem. LDP officials privately admitted that the activities were designed to shore-up Suzuki's image in the LDP, with the Japanese public, and the leadership in the United States.<sup>198</sup>

The issue has also been used by the Japan Defense Agency and others interested in seeing Japan's armed forces enlarged and modernized. The Soviet military build-up in the southern Kuriles has given the defense community plenty of ammunition to use in the budget fight. A "new and perilous threat" was now on the Japanese doorstep, for the Soviet soldiers in the Northern Territories became "the knife at Japan's throat" and "an indirect invasion."<sup>199</sup> While the Japanese public could shrug its shoulders at the Russian violations of Japanese airspace, the presence of numerous Soviet divisions surrounding Japan, and the SS-20's pointed in their direction, they were not allowed to ignore the 6,000 soldiers to the north. The JDA milked it for all it was worth. The Ground Self Defense Force Chief of Staff said:

As a result of the unexpectedly speedy Soviet military buildup, in both quantity and quality, it will be difficult to cope with the situation by relying on the strength of the Japanese Self Defense Forces as envisaged in the defense program; a revision of the defense program should be considered in the near future.<sup>200</sup>

The JDA also leaked a series of reports portraying an increase in the quantity and capabilities of new Russian military bases in the Northern Territories just at the time when the Diet was discussing the merits of purchasing more U.S.-made anti-submarine aircraft.<sup>201</sup> The matter was settled favorably for the JDA, and shortly afterwards the JDA quietly announced that the presence of the new bases could not be confirmed. Critics warn that the LDP "hawks" are using the territorial question to increase defense spending and thereby quiet

American demands for an increased Japanese role in its own defense.<sup>202</sup> And there can be little doubt that at the very least the Northern Territories have been used as a vehicle for increased public awareness of defense-related matters.

Other parties have manipulated the issue, too. The JCP has pointed to its position in the Northern Territories as proof to the Japanese electorate that it is a Japanese party and not part of an international communist conspiracy. In 1971 the JCP chairman Kenji Miyamoto met with CPSU chairman Brezhnev to discuss problems between the JCP and the CPSU. Miyamoto made headlines in Japan when he reported that Brezhnev had agreed to discuss the territorial claims (denied by the Soviet Foreign Ministry).<sup>203</sup> At a press conference after a 1979 JCP/CPSU meeting, Miyamoto again exploited the moment to report that about half of the discussion time was devoted to the Northern Territories and the associated problems.<sup>204</sup> That day the Asahi Evening News headlined, "Miyamoto Claims Way Has Been Opened for Territorial Talks."

The Japanese Socialist Party, besides proposing the demilitarization of Hokkaido and the Kuriles, has made political progress out of the issue. In its desire to revise U.S.-Japanese relations, the JSP leader, Ichio Asukata, equated the American bases in Okinawa to the Russian bases in the Northern Territories, and implied that the American bases posed a greater threat to Japan's security.<sup>205</sup> The New Liberal Club leaders visited Moscow in 1978 to discuss

the territorial issue, and even the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sokyo) has its territorial platform and activities. Political useage of the Northern Territories issue in Japan reminds one of the traditional American campaign practices of kissing babies and eating the local cooking - not everyone enjoys it, but it must be done.

### 3. The Northern Territories and Their Liabilities

Just as there are reasons for Japanese politicians to add to the ramparts of the Northern Territories issue, there are liabilities for such actions. In many ways it limits the flexibility of Japanese diplomacy vis-a-vis the Russians and restricts the pursuance of rational foreign policy. All of the post-war Japanese prime ministers and their governments have embraced, as an article of faith, the need for negotiations for the return of the islands. An objective analysis of that course of action has taken a back seat to the emotional rhetoric of an unyielding, inflexible stance. For a Japanese politician to question the right of his country's claim to the Northern Territories is to pursue a course of political impotence.

A notable example was that of the prominent international affairs critic, former editor of the Japan Times, and sometimes government troubleshooter, Kazushige Hirasawa. In an article written for a 1975 edition of Foreign Affairs, Hirasawa, in suggesting an answer to the Northern Territories stalemate, posed a three-part solution: (1) the Soviet Union

should return the Habomais and Shikotan to Japan in accordance with the 1956 Joint Declaration of Peace, (2) the Russians should grant Japanese fishermen access to southern Kurile waters, and (3) a peace treaty should be signed between Japan and the USSR, leaving the question of Kunashir and Iturup "frozen until the end of the present century", allowing mutual trust and cooperation to buildup in other areas and then open negotiations to determine the status of the two larger islands.<sup>206</sup> Hirasawa was roundly criticized by just about everyone in Japan. He was criticized in the media for weakening Japan's case and jeopardizing the ongoing Sino-Japanese peace treaty talks.<sup>207</sup> The non-governmental revanchist organizations expressed disgust at the proposal and derided his attempt to influence the Japanese position in a "foreign magazine."<sup>208</sup> Hirasawa, who had close ties to the then Prime Minister Miki, may have been sending up a trial balloon for the Miki government. If that was the intent, the government was soon convinced that to embrace the Hirasawa proposal would be counterproductive and politically disastrous. Even more diabolical may have been the possibility that the Miki government planned to use the Hirasawa plan as an instrument for arousing an anti-Soviet ground swell within the country.

A clear-headed national debate on the issue seems improbable, almost to the point that one wonders if there is a credible party or politician that would ever address

the issue in a context other than demanding that which will not be given.

The issue also erodes the independent nature of the opposition parties. They must either mimic the government's position or up the ante of the territory claimed to a level that proves they are a Japanese party whose intentions are out to protect the Japanese claims. And by doing so, they lose legitimacy as a credible opposition. Of equal if not greater concern is the effect on Japanese-Soviet relations. The campaigns, demonstrations, and "inspection" tours are guaranteed to provoke the Soviets. It is an unhealthy situation for all concerned; and although the Japanese (and the Russians) believe they have justifiable claims to the Northern Territories, to use the matter as a prod to goad a political opponent is a risky undertaking and foolhardy in light of the fact that the Soviet Union is an Asian power that will be on the East Asian scene, confronting Japan, for the foreseeable future.

#### E. THE JAPANESE PUBLIC

Gauging public opinion on a particular subject is a precarious business. Public opinion polls, surveys, and voting patterns are perhaps some indicators of opinions or trends, but they shed little light on the depth of convictions or emotions or the extent to which an issue will be defended. So it is with accurately measuring the attitudes of the Japanese people toward the Northern Territories problem.

### 1. Public Support

The government claims that the territorial issue commands overwhelming support from the public. They cite the fact that within the representative democracy of Japan, the Diet has passed resolution after resolution calling for the return of the islands and that all forty-eight prefectural assemblies have adopted similar measures.<sup>209</sup> A February 1979 Diet resolution initiated a petition for citizens to sign calling for the return of the southern Kuriles; by the end of November of the same year, over fifteen million signatures had been obtained. Young C. Kim's survey of nationwide newspaper polls on the subject highlight some interesting points: (1) almost no one takes the position that the Soviets are correct, (2) there is widespread support for the notion that the islands are inherent Japanese lands, and (3) support for the irredentist claim is strongest among Japan's elites (business leaders, bureaucrats, academia, the media, politicians, etc.).<sup>210</sup> What is not known is how much of the Northern Territories support is attributable to the general dislike of the Soviet Union. The Russians have consistently been rated by the Japanese as the most disliked country in the world; support for the viewpoint may be a result of the mental grouping of the issue with the sentiment for the USSR as a whole.

The public prescription for solving the problem is interesting. The Hokkaido Shimbun (12 August 1981), in

publishing the results of a poll it conducted among 1,000 Hokkaido residents, found that only .7% of the respondents thought it was "not necessary" to request the reversion of the islands. But in ascribing to the activity that they thought would be most productive to realizing the return of the Northern Territories, 31.5% said the southern Kuriles should be demanded from the Soviets, whereas 59.0% said that priority should be given to establishing economic and cultural ties.

Although the issue does not command the same emotional punch as did the Okinawa reversion campaign, the media (a very influential force) has been almost entirely with the government. The Japanese-Chinese rapprochement, the Russian stationing of military forces in the Northern Territories, and other actions (Afghanistan, Poland, etc.) have further turned media attentiveness to a suspicion of Soviet intentions.

## 2. The Fishermen

Other than the 16,000 former residents of the Northern Territories, the people most directly affected by the Soviet aggrandizement of the islands have been the fishermen in the area. The loss of the rich fishing grounds around the Kuriles and the advent of the 200-mile economic zones have played havoc on Japanese fishing. The Hokkaido fishermen, of course, have been especially hard hit. In 1980 alone one out of every six Hokkaido trawlers went out of business.<sup>211</sup> Japanese fishing, out of necessity, has evolved into an international



enterprise that depends to an increasing degree on resources located far away from the Japanese Islands, and that bodes hard times for the small family fishing businesses of Hokkaido.

Since 1977 Japan's catch in Russian-controlled waters has been reduced by 40%, and in order to fish in the Soviet waters (including the Northern Territories), Japanese fishermen must pay fishing fees, obtain licenses, and submit to on-board inspections by Russian patrol craft. Japan has reluctantly accepted these restrictions because of its dependence on fish as its primary source of protein, but in doing so has given de facto recognition to the Russians that the Northern Territories belong to the USSR. For those who fish in the Russian waters without Soviet approval, the risk of arrest and confiscation of the boats is constantly present. Since 1945 thousands of Japanese fishermen have been arrested and over a thousand boats confiscated.<sup>212</sup>

As the Northern Territories rhetoric from Tokyo heats up or "anti-Soviet" actions such as the Sino-Japanese PFT occur, fishing grounds are placed off limits and arrests and seizures are stepped-up. For the Japanese fishermen of Hokkaido the territorial pursuits of their government present a dilemma. As one fisherman put it:

I am a loyal Japanese. I think the four islands belong to Japan. The Soviets should give them back. But you can't deny that as of now there is no prospect for an early return. We can't force the Soviets to give them back. Meanwhile, our livelihood depends on the fish we catch. The more fuss we make about the four islands, the more likely the Soviets are to restrict our fishing zones.<sup>213</sup>

The Russians have used their consulate-general office in Sapporo to help set up branches of the Japanese-Soviet Friendship Association in an effort, among other things, to get Hokkaido citizens (especially fishermen) to renounce the government's aim of the reversion of the islands.<sup>214</sup> The Soviets have had some successes. Some fishermen have been given temporary permits to fish in the Russian waters in return for their promise of silence on the territorial issue. Many fishermen believe that the payment of the \$150 entrance fee to join the friendship clubs is a form of insurance against harsh treatment if caught by the Soviets.<sup>215</sup> Of Hokkaido's 50,000 fishermen, 500 or so have licenses to operate within the Soviet zone, many having doubled their catch.<sup>216</sup> Although Tokyo frowns on the 500, it allows the practice because as one Maritime Safety Agency official said, "After all, we are a free enterprise economy, and the fisherman who catches more fish gets more money. That is our dilemma."<sup>217</sup>

### 3. The Organized Reversion Movement

The organized irredentist movement consists of official and quasi-official groups dedicated to the return of the Northern Territories. There are four main groups among the countless others that are the largest and the most influential.<sup>218</sup> The League of Kurile-Habomais Residents, established in 1955, is based in Sapporo and limits its activities to assisting Kurile refugees and attending rallies and

demonstrations. Its membership consists largely of former inhabitants of the Kuriles and their descendants. The Headquarters for a Territorial Return and Northern Fisheries Policy, established in 1956, is based in Sapporo and publishes newsletters, bibliographies, and historical research on the Kuriles. It is directed, staffed, and partially funded by the Hokkaido prefectural government. The Alliance for the Return of the Northern Territories, established in 1965, is based in Tokyo and produces irredentist literature in Japanese and English and frequently acts as a lobbying group in the national and prefectural governments. Its board membership includes many well-known retired government and military officials and business leaders. Subsidized by both national and prefectural governments, the Alliance, because of its membership, is considered right-wing and anti-Soviet. The Northern Territories Problem Association, established in 1969, is based in Tokyo and is considered the most influential of the irredentist organizations. It is openly an instrument of the LDP and subsidized from its national funds. Its pronounced goal is "raising public consciousness and helping displaced residents"; board membership consists of prominent politicians, businessmen, and scholars.

All of the above organizations are supported by the LDP and as such are used as political tools to gain visibility for the LDP politicians and candidates. All of the organizations operate under the government's Northern Policy

Headquarters, an agency created by Prime Minister Sato in 1972 to coordinate and supervise the reversion groups and their activities and to dispense funds to those toeing the LDP line.<sup>219</sup> Because of LDP guidance, the irredentist groups have been boycotted by the opposition parties, resulting in the loss of some of their credibility as spokesmen for the Japanese people.

## VII. ROLES OF THE REGIONAL POWERS

Japanese-Soviet relations are, of course, to a significant degree dictated by their relations with the other regional powers. The countries of Asia and those with vested interests in the region are particularly concerned about the degree of cooperation in the Tokyo-Moscow connection; their perspectives are always to be considered by Japan and the Soviet Union as both sides seek to identify an acceptable balance in the relationship. Of particular concern for each are the roles played by the United States, the People's Republic of China, and the two Koreas. The Northern Territories dispute is an excellent barometer of these intertwining relationships.

### A. THE UNITED STATES

Although occasional shipwrecked American sailors and traders bound for the Japanese Islands happened to touch Kurile shores, the United States had no interests in any of the islands prior to World War II. At one time after the recapture of the western Aleutians from the Japanese in 1943, the Kuriles were considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a possible route to conduct the final assault of Japan. But the unpredictable weather and Soviet refusal to allow American bombers to utilize Kamchatka bases caused the abandonment of the idea.<sup>220</sup>

As previously stated, at Yalta President Roosevelt agreed with Stalin that the Kuriles would be "handed over" to the Russians as a stimulus for their participation in the final stages of the war against Japan. After V-J Day the American government denied any complicity in the Soviet occupation of the islands. Secretary of State James Byrnes told a joint session of Congress on 4 September 1945 that the United States had made no commitment to sustain the USSR's Far Eastern gains. In January 1946 the secret agreements made at Yalta were released to the public, and it was evident to all that the United States had been a willing partner in the Kuriles' new tenancy.

The advent of the Cold War and the apprehension about Soviet motives in the Far East brought on a change in American attitudes concerning the Kuriles. In preparation for the impending peace treaty with Japan, a State Department memo dated 14 October 1947 (and authored by George Kennan) recommended that, "The southern-most islands of the Kurile archipelago would be retained by Japan."<sup>221</sup> An accompanying map delineated all of the Northern Territories as Japanese possessions. The recommendation was approved by Secretary of State George C. Marshall and forwarded to SCAP headquarters in Tokyo.

In the negotiations leading up to the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, the United States supported neither the Soviet Union nor Japan's claims over the islands. John Foster Dulles, the architect of the peace treaty, disputed the Soviet

occupation of the Habomais and Shikotan, but used the naming of a beneficiary to Iturup and Kunashir as an enticement for Soviet participation at the peace conference. His strategy was for Japan to renounce its claims to the Kuriles (which it did) without naming the Russians as the new owners; that would enhance the American bargaining position with both countries at a conference to determine the fate of the Northern Territories. During the treaty ratification process in the United States, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee added a two-part proviso that stated that nothing in the treaty reduced Allied or Japanese rights to the Kuriles or sanctioned the Soviet aggrandizement of Japanese territory; the treaty was then overwhelmingly passed.

Twice (in 1952 and 1954) American aircraft were shot down by Soviet fighters after entering the airspace over the Habomais, and twice the U.S. government issued statements declaring that the Habomais and Shikotan were Japanese territory. During one point in the negotiations for the normalizations between Japan and the Soviet Union in 1956 it appeared as though a compromise on the Northern Territories was possible; on 19 August 1956 Secretary of State Dulles warned the Japanese foreign minister that an agreement to hand over Iturup and Kunashir to the USSR would bring an American request for permanent sovereignty over Okinawa. In an effort to reduce the ominous tone of their threat, the United States on 7 September 1956 sent Tokyo an aide-memoire

saying: (1) the Habomais and Shikotan are an integral part of Hokkaido, (2) the Yalta agreement was "simply a statement of common purpose" rather than a firm commitment, and (3) the final disposition of the Kuriles must be determined at an international conference.<sup>222</sup>

During the last twenty-five years the United States has played a limited role in the dispute, but has continued to support the Japanese position. In 1968 a World Airways flight carrying U.S. servicemen bound for Vietnam was forced to land on Iturup after violating Kurile airspace.<sup>223</sup> Washington apologized to Moscow for violating Soviet airspace and then had to apologize to Tokyo for apologizing to Moscow. Prime Minister Sato at one time asked President Nixon to intercede upon Japan's behalf at a summit conference with Premier Brezhnev, a request that was not acted upon.

But because the Northern Territories problem has an apparent low priority in U.S. relations with the countries involved, one should not surmise that there is little for the United States to be concerned about. A settlement of the problem and improvement in Japanese-Soviet relations could have grave consequences for the United States. Resolution of the territorial issue and its implications could graphically alter the situation in East Asia. It is therefore not too cynical to infer that the U.S. would prefer the current impasse in order to help achieve some of its goals in East Asia: increased Japanese defense responsibility in the region to assist in



checking the growth of Soviet military forces, a continuation of a perception by the nations of the region that Soviet aims in Asia are suspect, and the prevention of Japanese-Soviet cooperation. As evidence of the American desire to maintain the status quo, one need only examine the timing of the U.S. intelligence community's disclosure that the Russians had deployed military forces on Shikotan Island. The evidence was presented to the Japanese government on 25 September 1979, just as Foreign Minister Sonoda and his Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko, were meeting at the United Nations to discuss improved bilateral relations. The revelation also corresponded with the Japan-Soviet Business Cooperation Committee meeting held in Moscow to discuss the possibility of expanding joint economic projects in Siberia and the Soviet Far East. The Soviet response, via Radio Moscow, was prompt and livid:

It is not by accident that intelligence sources, behind whom hides the enemy of international detente and improved Soviet-Japanese relations, chose Sunday, 24 September, for disclosure of their report ... the publication on 24 September of the report is nothing but a provocation aimed against the improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations.<sup>224</sup>

The reality of close Japanese-Soviet relations would be potentially catastrophic to U.S. goals in East Asia. Because of the need to prevent such an accommodation, the dissolution of the Northern Territories problem might require the United States to attempt to foment a comparable issue.

## B. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

As could be expected, the People's Republic of China wholeheartedly supported Soviet claims to the Northern Territories throughout the 1950's. On 4 December 1950 Zhou Enlai made a speech expressing total support for Soviet retention of the entire archipelago, and in 1953 Radio Peking called the Japanese irredentist movement "war hysteria." But as the 1960's brought on the realization of an ever-widening Sino-Soviet split, the Chinese position changed. Chairman Mao Zedong, receiving an audience of members of the Japanese Socialist Party on 10 July 1964, shockingly announced, "I approve of the Kuriles being returned to Japan. Russia has already taken too much land."<sup>225</sup> Mao then listed Xinjiang, Outer Mongolia, the Amur region, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Baltic states as graphic examples of Soviet territorial aggrandizement and assured his stunned listeners that the Northern Territories were inseparable from China's own claims against the Soviet Union. The unexpected support no doubt heartened the Japanese and reinforced their perception of the Soviets as a threatening imperialist power.

Since the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes along the Ussuri River, Chinese support for Japan's territorial claims has intensified as Peking sought regional allies against the Soviet Union. On the eve of Prime Minister Tanaka's summit conference with Premier Brezhnev in October 1973, China's United Nations delegate, Qiao Guanhua, enumerated the PRC's support for Japan's

Northern Territories stand in an address to the UN General Assembly.<sup>226</sup> To the present day, the Chinese defend the right of the Japanese people to seek return of the islands that "from time immemorial ... have always been an intrinsic part of Japan's territory."<sup>227</sup> Of course, the Chinese position has not evolved out of any sympathy for Japanese irredentism. Chinese motives are fourfold: (1) China has its own territorial claims against the Russians, (2) Peking has designs on a closer relationship with Tokyo at the expense of the Soviets, (3) the PRC can propagandize against the Soviets and their "hegemonistic" behavior, and (4) China wants to reinforce its own claims to Taiwan.

The struggle to contain the influence and the power of the Soviet Union is probably a close second to the "Four Modernizations" program in the priorities of the Peking leadership. Its importance is so great as to allow the Chinese to embrace the United States and Japan as partners in its "anti-hegemony" scheme in Asia. The growing menace of Soviet military power in East Asia can only be a disheartening trend; while insignificant by itself, a Soviet presence in the Northern Territories as part of the overall growth of Soviet armed power presents a growing strategic threat. In addition to a geo-strategic confrontation in the region, the Chinese maintain their own territorial demands against the Russians. The PRC still claims some minor river islands near Khabarovsk and vast expanses of wasteland west of Xinjiang. By supporting Japan's territorial

claims, the Chinese have established a de facto "common front" against Soviet territorial expansion.

#### 1. Wooing the Japanese

The Chinese have used the Northern Territories issue to cause the Japanese to abandon its professed "equidistance" between the PRC and the USSR; Peking's goal has been to attract Tokyo to its side while impeding any closer Japanese-Soviet relations, especially economic and technological exchange projects. In order to achieve the objective, the Chinese have portrayed the territorial issue as a diplomatic, military, and political assault on Japan by the Soviets. The Chinese pointed to the Russian military maneuvers around the Northern Territories in mid-1978 as proof of Moscow's burning desire to prevent the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty and strutted that "... all these maneuvers have only served to further confirm Soviet hegemonism. In the end, China and Japan have signed their treaty of peace and friendship."<sup>228</sup> Peking characterized the PFT as "a thorn in the flesh for the Soviet Union" and declared that "only Soviet social-imperialism is not happy."<sup>229</sup> Additionally, the Chinese see the Northern Territories as the lever used by the USSR to coerce the Japanese into signing a peace treaty with its northern neighbor, but that "the Soviet demand for concluding the peace treaty harbors aggressive designs against Japan."<sup>230</sup>

The territorial issue presents the Chinese propagandists with a line of reasoning (completely in line with the Americans)

to induce Japan to increase its defense spending. The Peking Daily carried an article that spelled out the threat and an appropriate response:

The harsh reality has once again warned that dark clouds are now gathering over the Japanese Islands and that in the changing situation Japan is being threatened by Soviet hegemonism. In confronting Soviet inroads into the Japanese Islands, what should Japan do to cope with the threat of aggression? ... Given these circumstances, it is quite natural for the Japanese people to press for a military buildup and reinforcement such as a defense system compatible with self determination.<sup>231</sup>

The Chinese cite the Russian desire for turning the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan into an extended "Soviet lake" and the "neighborliness" of placing long range artillery and assault helicopters directly adjacent to Japan as proof that the Russians have military designs on Japan and that the Japanese desperately need to address their defensive shortcomings. Furthermore, the Soviet Union's ambition of world domination has blinded its leaders to any appreciation of the Japanese position on the Northern Territories, and Moscow plans to "take full advantage of its geographical position and military strength" to force Japan to yield to the Soviet point of view.<sup>232</sup> The Soviet drive for a treaty of good neighborliness and cooperation is seen by Peking as a Russian attempt "to turn Japan into an eastern bulwark of Soviet hegemonism."<sup>233</sup>

Imposition of the territorial problem by the Chinese into the sphere of Japanese-Soviet economic cooperation is also a favorite tool of the Peking leadership. The Russian armed forces on the islands are said to be there to "make Japan

subservient to the Soviet Union politically and induce it to provide technology and capital for the economic development of Siberia."<sup>234</sup> The USSR is taking advantage of their military strength in the region to "blackmail" Japan and is depending on Japanese developmental cooperation in the Soviet Far East and Siberia "in view of its aggravating shortage of industrial resources."<sup>235</sup> But the PRC warns Japan of the consequences of relenting to Soviet pressures:

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, developing Siberia is primarily aimed at rapidly strengthening its military and economic position in the Far East. The Japanese offer to open up Siberia is an act of helping the Soviet Union expand its arms and prepare for war.<sup>236</sup>

The annual Japanese-Soviet fishing negotiations are illustrations, say the Chinese, of further blackmail by Moscow. The "new tsars' highhandedness" is exposed in trying to compel the Japanese to yield on the territorial question by threatening the lifeline of the Japanese fishing industry.

All of these attempts by the Chinese to portray the Northern Territories problem in terms of Russian blackmailing and desire for world domination are designed to solicit Japanese cooperation in its "Four Modernizations" program, prevent closer Japanese-Soviet economic cooperation, and induce Tokyo to abandon any vestiges of its equidistance policy.

## 2. Soviet Hegemonism

The Northern Territories also provides the Chinese the opportunity to expose to other nations the nature of Moscow's hegemonistic design for world domination. Politburo member

Yao Wan-yuan declared that Moscow's refusal to return the Northern Territories or even discuss the issue was proof to all of Soviet hegemonism.<sup>237</sup> Japan's activities to return the islands are "righteous acts of a sovereign nation."<sup>238</sup> But Moscow's goal, says Peking, is world domination. Peking asserts that this is what the Soviet Union has in mind when it proposes to Japan a treaty of good neighborliness and cooperation and what it has in mind for the rest of Asia when it proposes an Asian collective security arrangement - collective under Soviet domination, and with security only for the USSR.

The Chinese say that if the USSR really wanted good relations with Japan, it would return the Northern Territories; the implication is that Sino-Soviet relations may, in part, depend on a satisfactory solution to China's own irredentist claims. There is also the slightest trace of racism in the Chinese criticisms; in citing the "arrogance" of the Russians for not allowing Japanese to visit their ancestral gravesites in the Kuriles, Peking gives rise to the conveyance of non-Asian Soviet insensitivity to Asian cultures and ways of life.

### 3. Taiwan Claim

The PRC's desire to incorporate Taiwan into its political sphere is also a motivation for the Chinese involvement in Japan's territorial dispute with the USSR. By claiming that Japan has an inalienable right to its inherent territory, the Chinese underscore that they, too, have a right to their inherent land - Taiwan. With the exception of a relatively

small group of Chinese who advocate that Taiwan should separate from the mainland and become an independent nation, no Chinese, communist or nationalist, subscribes to anything but the position that Taiwan is an integral part of the Chinese nation. The quid pro quo with Japan of honoring traditional territorial integrity suits the purposes of both countries.

#### 4. The Senkakus

The Senkaku Islands are a small eight-island group south of the Ryukyus and north of Taiwan. They are claimed by Taiwan, the PRC, and Japan. Taipei and Peking claim they are part of Taiwan and thus Chinese, while Japan says they are part of the Ryukyus. The Senkakus were administered by the United States at the conclusion of World War II and used by them for bombing practice in the 1950's.<sup>239</sup> But the problem in no way evokes the same emotionalism as the Northern Territories problem. In fact, the whole controversy may never have materialized except for the oil exploration that has been going on in the East China Sea and all that that implies. A confrontation between armed Chinese fishing boats and Japanese patrol craft in April 1978 has been explained by Chinese Defense Minister Geng Biao as accidental and unplanned and was attributed to a dissident faction in China's eastern maritime provinces who had been hostile to the Deng regime.<sup>240</sup> Although there is a territorial issue between the two nations, China and Japan have consciously decided that the Senkakus will not effect their relations, and unlike the Northern Territories, for now the Japanese are willing to let the issue rest in peace.



### C. THE KOREAS

Korea, the renowned meeting place of the great powers in East Asia, is as divided over the Northern Territories question as is the peninsula itself. The Republic of Korea (ROK), or South Korea, has vociferously supported the Japanese claims while the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, touts the Soviet line. However, the shifting scene in the region has tended to mollify the stances of both nations.

#### 1. The Republic of Korea

The ROK's statements in support of the Japanese claims against the USSR have equated the Soviet aggrandizement of the Northern Territories and the expansion of communist forces to its own threat from communist aggression to its immediate north. The intent of the ROK is not to beneficently take the side of Japan (who only in the recent past ended its own colonial rule over the entire Korean peninsula), but rather to hold-up the communist ideology in front of world opinion as being a ravenous predator seeking to gobble-up the territories of helpless victims. Thus, the ROK can level like charges at its northern counterpart.

The ROK, despite its history of staunch support for the Japanese viewpoint in the Northern Territories, has recently been conspicuously silent about the dispute. Its position (along with the DPRK) as the crossroads of big-power Asia has made the South Koreans distinctly aware of the impact

of any political stands it takes involving its neighbors. The ROK has, somewhat reluctantly, made Japan and cooperation with the Japanese "the cornerstone of its Asia policy."<sup>241</sup> Economic intercourse has flourished, yet frictions remain. The legacy of the Japanese colonial period, the legal status of the 600,000 Koreans that live in Japan, conservative Japanese support of Korean economic expansion and military contributions, and other irritants are some of the problems that grace South Korean-Japanese relations.

The ROK and Japan have their own territorial dispute over Takeshima (Tok-to in Korean).<sup>242</sup> The small island in the Sea of Japan, like the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkakus, had little significance prior to the concentrated efforts of oil exploration in the Japan Sea and the advent of the 200-mile maritime economic zones. Unresolved by the 1965 normalization of relations between Japan and the ROK, the Takeshima issue suffers from the same historical revisionism that surrounds the Northern Territories. For the ROK to totally support the concept of Japan's right to regain its inalienable territory might soften its own claims to Takeshima.

ROK-Soviet relations must also be considered. The ROK has traditionally been viewed by the Soviets as an American puppet - a puppet that provides the U.S. with a basis for involvement in East Asia and a nation, in its own right, that has made significant economic gains. Recent relations appear to have moved out of the Cold War stereotype; the USSR has

demonstrated a new willingness to accept a two-Korea policy.<sup>243</sup> The Soviets have, within the last decade, referred to the Seoul regime by its proper name, the Republic of Korea.<sup>244</sup> The South Koreans have attended international conferences and athletic events in the Soviet Union at Moscow's invitation. And South Korea was surprisingly one of the few countries in the region that supported Brezhnev's collective security plan.<sup>245</sup> Still, Moscow's support for the DPRK and its "traditional" communist aims leads to Seoul's suspicions of the Soviet Union.

Like the Japanese, the South Koreans have territory-related problems with the Russians. At the end of World War II some 50,000 Koreans who were forceably relocated to Sakhalin Island by their Japanese rulers fell under the administration of the USSR. All efforts by the ROK to have them repatriated back to Korea have been ignored by the Soviets.<sup>246</sup> Families who were split during the war years have had to endure the continued separation of their loved ones. Even postal service from the ROK to the Sakhalin Koreans has been subject to the whims of the Russians. South Korean fishermen, like their Japanese counterparts, have had to contend with Soviet patrol craft monitoring Russian fishing grounds.<sup>247</sup> ROK boats are sometimes seized and confiscated and crews returned only after an all too lengthy stay in a Russian jail.

The Republic of Korea in the Northern Territories dispute, at least within recent times, has taken the position that it is best to remain silent. The less said about an

emotional problem that involves two of its powerful neighbors the better.

## 2. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The DPRK has stridently supported the Soviet claims to the Northern Territories and opposed the revanchist claims of the "ruling circles of the Japanese reactionaries."<sup>248</sup> And yet, like the ROK, the North Koreans have toned-down their criticism of the Japanese over the matter in the recent past. Their reluctance to interject themselves into a bilateral controversy that involves the military and economic giants of the region is understandable, for both will impact greatly on the future of the DPRK.

Post-war Japan has consistently been viewed by Pyongyang as an instrument of the United States' designs in Northeast Asia. It has reacted harshly to Japan's "becoming deeper embroiled by each step in the U.S. imperialists' Korean and Asian strategies and joining the U.S. imperialists in preparations for another war of aggression in Asia."<sup>249</sup> North Korean rhetoric accuses Tokyo of embarking upon a "new Japanese militarism" and acquiescing to U.S. demands to be used as "shock troops" against the DPRK. Yet the North Koreans do not want to totally alienate the Japanese. Japan presents the Pyongyang regime with a window to the rest of the world, a potential source for economic assistance, and a medium for expanding diplomatic relations. Whether the DPRK will attempt to employ the Japanese in any of these manners remains to be seen, but to discard

the Japanese as useless and totally antagonistic would seem foolhardy.

Soviet-North Korean relations are an enigma. Pyongyang knows that its economic and military bread is buttered in the USSR. Despite President Kim Il Sung's "Juche" (self-reliance) program, the Soviet Union provides a considerable amount of this type of aid, far more than any other nation including the PRC. In return, the Soviets have been able to check further Chinese influence in the country and have begun to use the North Korean port of Najin (northeast coast) as a naval port-of-call, its first extensive use coming during the Sino-Vietnamese border war of 1979 and emergency shipments by the Russians to Haiphong.<sup>250</sup> Scattered reports have also surfaced that Najin is being considered as a submarine base for the Pacific Fleet. Yet North Korea must balance its policy between the two continental colossuses of Russia and China. Hence, North Korean support of Soviet activities has not been a knee-jerk response. In a February 1980 socialist bloc parliamentary conference in Sofia, the DPRK abstained from voting on a motion supporting the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan; in a September 1980 meeting of the same body in East Berlin, Pyongyang abstained from voting on a resolution criticizing the invasion.<sup>251</sup> Kampuchea's Prince Norodom Sihanouk, a personal friend of Kim Il Sung and a frequent resident of Pyongyang, reported that Kim was deeply shaken by the Afghanistan invasion and that it reinforced his distrust of the Soviet Union.<sup>252</sup>

As this balancing act pertains to the Northern Territories problem, the DPRK, like the ROK, has been more than content to let the Soviets and the Japanese settle the issue. Occasionally Pyongyang will denounce the Japanese and their side of the issue, as during the furor over the Russian arming of Shikotan:

Of late, Japanese official propaganda has been resorting to the most refined methods to condition the mass of the people, above all the youth, to the idea of an alleged "Soviet threat", making the people believe that the actions of the Japanese militarists, which led to military failure, were mainly "correct" and that one must now prepare once again for an "emergency."<sup>253</sup>

Both the ROK and the DPRK have, in recent times, officially ignored the Northern Territories problem. No doubt, both closely watch the state of affairs as it pertains to their own national interests. But both are quite clearly in a wait-and-see mode, not willing to insert themselves into a position that could possibly eliminate some of the options they now retain.

## VIII. A PROGNOSIS FOR RESOLUTION

### A. NEAR TERM

The likelihood of the Northern Territories problem being solved to the acceptable satisfaction of both nations is, in the near term and under the present circumstances, indeed remote. The Japanese press reports even the slightest variance in the Soviet position as if it were a great breakthrough. Once when Foreign Minister Sonoda returned from Moscow where talks were held on the dispute (January 1978), he was quoted as saying that he considered the return of the islands "was not necessarily an impossibility."<sup>254</sup> The Japanese press went wild with stories that a solution to the territorial dispute was at hand. Another uproar was caused by a member of the Supreme Soviet when he said, "... let us place a comma on the territorial problem and not a period."<sup>255</sup> Any statement by a Soviet official concerning the Northern Territories that does not mention the word "settled" is considered to display a "flexible stand."

But despite sensationalistic reporting, the cold facts of reality tell another story. Political, economic, and military rationality call for the Russians to hold on to the islands. Politically the islands represent a token of leverage against the Japanese; although poorly timed and frequently mishandled in the past, the Northern Territories have been used as an instrument in an attempt to modify Japanese international

behavior. Economically, they provide a significant portion of the Soviet fishing resources, while denying them to the Japanese. And militarily, they guarantee an access to the open ocean, provide surveillance platforms, and offer staging areas for potential operations against Japan. The arming of the islands with ground troops is particularly significant; it indicates the resolve of the Soviets (at least in the near term) to retain the islands in the face of what it sees as unfavorable circumstances. Currently, nothing could be gained for the USSR if it decided to yield to Japanese demands except a slight abatement of the animosity felt for the Russians by the Japanese. But there is plenty of animosity already engrained that would make such mood transitory.

The Japanese position seems as intractable as that of the Soviets. Politically, the mere suggestion of the abandonment of the Northern Territories as a national cause would be disastrous for any Japanese politician. The relations with the People's Republic of China and with the United States dictate the continued maintenance of an unflinching resolve on the matter. Further, the Japanese are not likely to be moved by promises of Soviet economic concessions; the Japanese commitment to the capitalist economic system and a reluctance to become dependent on Soviet-controlled resources, coupled with an historic mistrust of the Russian nation, militate against a significant modification of the Japanese position.



The prognosis for the near term is a continuation of the present stalemate.

#### B. LONG TERM

A solution to the Northern Territories problem should not be considered an impossibility, for today's conditions are not likely to remain static into the next century. Under what conditions would the Soviets return all or part of the islands or at least agree to discuss the problem? The contention here is that the Soviets will not shift their position unless they feel as though they have an excellent opportunity to woo the Japanese away from the influence of the United States and, to a lesser degree, the People's Republic of China. Under present conditions that does not appear to be a logical possibility. But circumstances, such as any of the following, could change that:

(1) Economic warfare - a breakdown of the U.S.-Western Europe-Japan economic system; Malthusian resource constraints; trade protectionism; a return to nationalistic merchantilistic mentalities.

(2) Political turnaround - an abrogation of the U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty due to economic warfare, the Japanese population's refusal to do more for its own defense, and/or overriding American commitments in other global regions; disillusionment with economic relations with the PRC; the rise to power in Japan of a political force favorable to the USSR, antagonistic to the U.S. and the PRC.

(3) Resource access - the threatened failure of the global system to support Japan with adequate natural resources; enticements by the Soviet Union to the Siberian and Far Eastern resources; impositions of embargoes of goods going to Japan.

(4) A stronger Japan - a militarily rearmed Japan (with nuclear weapons); a weakened USSR due to conflicts elsewhere in the world or domestic revolt; as a consequence, the Soviet desire to placate a strong neighbor and a Japanese refusal to tolerate the continued Soviet occupation of the Northern Territories.

Admittedly, some of the conditions listed above seem far-fetched, yet some may one day become all too real. One thing that is certain is that there will be change. A combination of some of the above, to whatever degree, may cause the Soviet Union and Japan to reconsider their stance on the Northern Territories. The intriguing question is what part, if any, could the territorial dispute play in enhancing or retarding the development of any of the above conditions.

#### C. THE SHAPE OF CHANGE

The changing of positions on the Northern Territories may take several forms and might manifest itself in one of the six following courses of action:

(1) Discussing the problem - The Soviet Union gains nothing except the ire of Japan (and the denunciation of China) by claiming that no territorial problem exists. An effort by the

Russians to at least discuss the problem may help ease tensions between the two and provide the opportunity for an eventual solution.

(2) Return of the Habomais alone - The Habomais have no strategic or tactical military value. They are too small for airfields and troop concentrations and are relatively isolated from the Kunashir Channel. Although they are trading material from the Soviet perspective, any Japanese negotiator would have a difficult time selling a proposal to his government that would reclaim only a very small portion of the disputed lands.

(3) Return of the Habomais and Shikotan - Basically, this is the Hirasawa proposal (see Chapter VI). A return of these islands was first promised in 1956 in the Joint Declaration of Peace, and their reversion would be a boost to Japanese diplomatic stature and a generous concession by the Soviets. Shikotan does have tactical military value (an airfield, harbor, troop facilities, and close to the Kunashir Channel) and as such would be difficult to obtain Soviet agreement.

(4) Return of the entire Northern Territories - Given today's circumstances, this possibility can be realized only as a result of a monumental transformation of the Russian national paradigm. The Russian distrust of the Japanese, their concept of territorial aggrandizement, their preoccupation with security matters, and their sincere belief that the Northern Territories belong to them as a result of their efforts during the "Great Patriotic War" all make it highly

improbable that the USSR will ever voluntarily relinquish control of the southern Kuriles.

(5) Dismissing the problem - Of course, the Soviets would agree to this; and conversely, this solution presupposes a change in the outlook of the Japanese. The Japanese' adamant stand is based on their historical claims, their commitment to the economic and political philosophies common to the West, their domestic political considerations, their search for international friends and security, and the burning mistrust and hatred for the Russians. As in (4), this solution appears highly unlikely.

(6) Deterioration of the Japanese position - Should Japan continue to discard the path of military revitalization and U.S. support for Japan drastically decline, increased pressure by the Soviet Union may cause not only the Japanese abandonment of any claims in the Northern Territories, but also the granting of concessions to the Russians in other areas (technology, capital useage, preferential trade agreements, etc.). It should be noted that the Russians had at one time (through early explorers and trappers) laid claims in and around parts of Hokkaido.

So where does this leave the controversy? Right where it has always been, in a stalemate. Hirasawa's plan was as rational and progressive as could be expected. And yet, it was soundly refuted by the Japanese and ignored by the Russians. The strident rhetoric, the diplomatic machinations,

the military maneuvers, and the propagandistic ballyhoo have committed each side to a stance that appears to be intractable.

Finally, what if the problem were solved? What would the global and regional implications of a demonstrative improvement in Japanese-Soviet relations involve? It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore all of the possible ramifications of such an event. Perhaps former Japanese Prime Minister Miki said it best when he declared, "If the territorial problem could be solved, the resulting Soviet-Japanese cooperation would be felt not just in Asia, but throughout the world."<sup>256</sup>

## IX. CONCLUSION

The Northern Territories are not really the major obstacle to increased Japanese-Soviet "good neighborliness and cooperation." The territorial issue is only a symptomatic manifestation of the basic disparities of their national paradigms. As has previously been mentioned, if the Northern Territories did not exist, there would most likely be some other issue that would prevent closer relations. Professor Young C. Kim feels that the realization of a significant improvement in Japanese-Soviet relations will occur "only under an extraordinary combination of several circumstances":<sup>257</sup>

- (1) A major realignment of Japanese domestic political forces.
- (2) A radical reorientation and restructuring of existing Japanese patterns of trade and economic ties.
- (3) A significant deterioration in Japanese relations with the United States and/or China.
- (4) A sharp decrease in the profound distrust that the Japanese have for the Russians.

All of the above circumstances, while possible, seem unlikely to occur. Although the LDP has in recent times displayed a tenuous hold on the control of the Diet, the conservative force in Japan is strong, and a coalition of political forces making an appreciable shift in the direction of radical social, economic, and diplomatic change is highly improbable. Although there are certainly pitfalls and potential problems on Japan's economic and trade horizons, the Japanese economic "miracle" is fact. The Japanese success

story is the country's greatest stabilizer. The perpetuation of that phenomenon is dependent on Japan's ability to continue to operate harmoniously within the present international economic system.


The dependence on the United States for its security (with confluence of Chinese security objectives) is widely held throughout Japan as a necessity. Even the opposition parties, who for years have promoted a campaign to abolish the Mutual Defense Treaty, have acknowledged that defense ties with the United States are useful.

But the biggest obstacle to improving Japanese-Soviet relations is the legacy of their historical experiences. The Soviets remember the Japanese surprise attack on their naval forces at Port Arthur and the Russian people's shameful defeat by an Asian nation; they remember the Siberian Intervention led by the Japanese and Tokyo's early anti-bolshivism; they remember the Manchurian border clashes of the late 1930's and the rise of Japanese militarism; they are concerned over the massive economic, technological, and increasing (from their perspective) military power that is displayed in Japan; and they understand the significance of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty and its anti-hegemony clause. For their part, the Japanese remember the Liaotung "Triple Intervention", Russian interference in Korea, the "treacherous" Soviet attack in 1945, the disappearance of tens of thousands of its prisoners of war while in Soviet captivity, the military and political

threats to Japan's sovereignty, and the Northern Territories. As a result, the Soviet Union has consistently been rated the "most hated" country in the world by the Japanese public.<sup>258</sup> I do not believe that the profound consequences of these historical dealings can be overdrawn.


Japan is culturally different from the United States, yet there are close ties. Japan has territorial disputes with the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea but continues to have relatively good relations with both. Japan and Western Europe have economic problems, but there are no overt hostilities. The ASEAN nations and Australia have witnessed the march of Japanese militarism, yet they, too, have progressive relations with Japan. The Soviet Union alone is regarded as the "potential threat" to Japan. The assessment is based on Russian military power, Japanese apprehensions about Soviet intentions, a perception of the Soviet threat as shared (and enhanced) by the United States, and the debilitating effects of their historical experience. The Northern Territories problem can only be viewed as an extension of this confrontational relationship.






The Kurile Islands

Source: John J. Stephan, The Kuril Islands  
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p.10.




The Northern Territories

Source: John J. Stephan, The Kuril Islands (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p.196.



The Japanese-Soviet Frontier

Source: John J. Stephan, The Kuril Islands (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p.224.



Soviet Forces in the Northern Territories

Source: 1981 Far Eastern Economic Review  
Asia Yearbook

A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN THE  
NORTHERN TERRITORIES DISPUTE

Feb. 1855	Treaty of Shimoda; Kuriles legally divided between Russia and Japan; Sakhalin co-owned.
May 1875	Treaty of St. Petersburg; all of the Kuriles to Japan, all of Sakhalin to Russia.
1904-05	Russo-Japanese War; Japan gets southern Sakhalin and right to fish in Russian waters.
Aug. 1925	First airfield established on Iturup.
Nov.-Dec. 1941	Iturup's Hitokoppu Bay is used as a marshalling area for the naval force to be used at Pearl Harbor.
June 1942	Paramishir-based amphibious forces attack the western Aleutians.
July 1943	U.S. bombers first attack the Kuriles.
Nov. 1943	Cairo Conference; Japan to forfeit all territory gained by "violence and greed."
Nov. 1943	Teheran Conference; President remarks that the Kuriles had been awarded to Japan as a result of the Russo-Japanese War.
Feb. 1944	First U.S. naval bombardment of the Kuriles.
Dec. 1944	Stalin tells U.S. envoy Averell Harriman that the Kuriles should be "returned" to the USSR.
Feb. 1945	Yalta Conference; "The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union."
July 1945	The Potsdam Conference.
Aug. 1945	The Pacific War ends; the Kuriles are invaded by the Soviet Union; Japan accepts the Potsdam Declaration limiting it to the four major islands and such minor islands as the Allies would determine.

20 Sep. 1945	The Kuriles are declared to be Soviet territory.
Jan. 1946	The secret provisions of the Yalta Conference are made public.
25 Feb. 1947	The Kuriles (to include Shikotan and the Habomais) are formally integrated as a component of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Dec. 1949	First Japanese official statement claiming the Northern Territories.
Dec. 1950	The PRC announces its support for the USSR's claim to the Northern Territories.
Sep. 1951	San Francisco Peace Conference; Japan renounces any claims to the Kuriles; Japan declares that the Northern Territories are not part of the Kuriles.
Sep. 1956	U.S. issues an <u>aide-memoire</u> to Tokyo supporting Japanese claims to the Northern Territories.
Oct. 1956	Japanese-Soviet Peace Declaration signed; Soviets agree to return the Habomais and Shikotan upon consummation of a peace treaty.
Jan. 1960	Soviets state that all foreign troops must leave Japan before any islands can be returned.
June 1960	Soviet ground troops withdraw from the Northern Territories.
Dec. 1961	Premier Krushchev declares the issue is "settled."
May 1964	Soviets allow Japanese to visit ancestors' graves on Shikotan and the Habomais with only Japanese identification cards required for entry.
July 1964	Chairman Mao supports Japanese claims to the Northern Territories.

Sep. 1964	Krushchev states that the sole reason for the delay in returning the territories claimed by Japan is the presence of U.S. troops and bases in Japan.
May 1970	Japanese Ministry of Education orders all textbooks to portray the Northern Territories as part of Japan.
Jan. 1972	Gromyko offers to return the Habomais and Shikotan in exchange for Japan's renunciation of claims to Iturup and Kunashir and adherence to Brezhnev's collective security plan; offer is rejected.
May 1972	Okinawa returns to Japanese sovereignty.
Oct. 1973	Tanaka-Brezhnev summit meeting; Japan leaves with the impression that the Northern Territories issue is still negotiable.
Apr. 1975	Okean II Soviet military exercises.
Oct. 1975	Kazushige Hirasawa's Northern Territories solution is published.
Jan. 1976	Gromyko offers to exchange Shikotan and the Habomais for a Japanese promise not to sign a treaty with the PRC that contains an anti-hegemony clause; offer is rejected.
Sep. 1976	Foreign Minister Miyazawa's "inspection" tour of the Northern Territories; Soviets reinstitute the policy of requiring passports and visas to visit graves on Shikotan and the Habomais.
Mar. 1977	Japan and the USSR declare 200-mile economic zones.
May 1977	Japanese-Soviet Fisheries Agreement.
Feb. 1978	Soviets unilaterally publish a proposed treaty of "friendship and good neighborliness"; there is no mention in the proposed treaty of the territorial dispute; Japanese reject the offer.
May-June 1978	Soviet military maneuvers around the Northern Territories; first Soviet troops stationed in the Northern Territories since 1960.

12 Aug. 1978	Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty.
Jan. 1979	The JDA announces that Soviet troop levels in the Northern Territories have risen to 5,000.
May 1979	Soviet troops are deployed to Shikotan.
Sep. 1979	U.S. intelligence sources present information to the Japanese government concerning the Soviet military buildup in Shikotan; the JDA announces that Soviet troop levels in the Northern Territories have risen to 10,000.
Sep. 1980	Japan brings the Northern Territories issue before the UN General Assembly.
Dec. 1980	The JDA announces that new airfields are being constructed on Iturup.
Feb. 1981	Japanese Diet proclaims 7 February as an annual "Northern Territories Day."
Sep. 1981	Prime Minister Suzuki conducts an "inspection" of the Northern Territories; Diet mission visits European countries and the United Nations to solicit support for its Northern Territories position.



## APPENDIX A

### THE TREATY OF SHIMODA, 7 FEBRUARY 1855 (EXTRACT)

#### Article II

Henceforth the boundaries between Russia and Japan will pass between the islands Iturup and Uruppu. The whole island of Iturup belongs to Japan and the whole island of Uruppu and the other Kurile Islands to the north constitute possessions of Russia. As regards the island Karafuto (Sakhalin), it remains unpartitioned between Russia and Japan, as has been the case up to this time.

Source: George A. Lensen, The Russian Push Toward Japan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 475.

## APPENDIX B

### THE TREATY OF ST. PETERSBURG, 7 MAY 1875 (EXTRACT)

#### Article II

In exchange for the cession to Russia of the rights on the island of Sakhalin, stipulated in the first article, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, for Himself and His descendants, cedes to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan the group of the Kurile Islands which he possesses at present, together with all the rights of sovereignty appertaining to this possession, so that henceforth the said group of Kurile Islands will belong to the Empire of Japan ... so that the boundary between the Empires of Russia and Japan in these areas shall pass through the strait between Cape Lopatka of the peninsula of Kamchatka and the island of Shimushu.

Source: George A. Lensen, The Russian Push Toward Japan Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 501.

## APPENDIX C

### THE CAIRO DECLARATION, 27 NOVEMBER 1943 (EXTRACT)

The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all islands in the Pacific which she has seized and occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories that Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.

Source: United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, the Conferences of Cairo and Teheran (Washington, 1961), pp. 448-449.

APPENDIX D

THE YALTA AGREEMENT, 11 FEBRUARY 1945 (EXTRACT)

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:

- a. The southern part of Sakhalin as well as all islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union.

. . . . .

3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

Source: United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, the Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, 1955), p. 984.

APPENDIX E

THE POTSDAM DECLARATION, 26 JULY 1945 (EXTRACT)

8. The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

Source: United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), 1945 (Washington, 1960), p. 1281.

APPENDIX F

THE SAN FRANCISCO PEACE TREATY, 8 SEPTEMBER 1951 (EXTRACT)

Article II

c. Japan renounces all right, title, and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 September 1905.

Source: United States, Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, 1952, Part 3 (Washington, 1952), p. 3172.

APPENDIX G

THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AIDE-MEMOIRE ON YALTA, KURILES 7 SEPTEMBER 1956  
(EXTRACT)

With respect to the territorial question, as the Japanese Government has been previously informed, the United States regards the so-called Yalta Agreement as simply a statement of common purposes by the then heads of the participating powers, and not as a final determination by those powers or of any legal effect in transferring territories. The San Francisco Peace Treaty (which conferred no rights on the Soviet Union because it refused to sign) did not determine the sovereignty of the territories renounced by Japan, leaving the question, as was stated by the Delegate of the United States at San Francisco, to "international solvents other than this treaty."

It is the considered opinion of the United States that by virtue of the San Francisco Peace Treaty Japan does not have the right to transfer sovereignty over the territories renounced by it therein. In the opinion of the United States, the signatories of the San Francisco Treaty would not be bound to accept any action of this character and would presumably reserve all their rights thereunder.

The United States has reached the conclusion after careful examination of the historical facts that the islands of Iturup and Kunashir (along with the Habomai Islands and Shikotan which are a part of Hokkaido) have always been part of Japan

proper and should in justice be acknowledged as under Japanese sovereignty. The United States would regard Soviet Agreement to this effect as a positive contribution to the reduction of tension in the Far East.

Source: John J. Stephan, The Kurile Islands (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 246.



## APPENDIX H

### JAPANESE-SOVIET JOINT DECLARATION OF PEACE 19 OCTOBER 1956 (EXTRACT)

9. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan agree to continue, after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet socialist Republics and Japan, negotiations for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty.

In this connection, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and taking into consideration the interests of the Japanese State, agrees to transfer to Japan the Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan, the actual transfer of these islands to Japan to take place after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan.

Source: John J. Stephan, The Kurile Islands (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 247.

#### NOTES

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